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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 20011017-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2001). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3X0 (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant's post-crime inculpatory 
statements to his ex-girlfriend were admissible non-hearsay, but his self-serving statements 
to her were inadmissible hearsay and lacked corroboration and any indicia of reliability? 
A trial court has "considerable discretion to manage the admission of evidence." 
Matter of Estate of Russell, 852 P.2d 997, 998 (Utah 1993). "Unless such discretion is 
abused, [the appellate court] will affirm its exercise." Id. at 999. Accord State v. 
Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^ f 24, 52 P.3d 1194. The court's underlying factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error. See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, K 13, 4 P.3d 778. 
STATUTES, RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following determinative statutes and rules, together with any other provision cited 
in the body of this brief, are attached in Addendum A: 
UTAH R. EVID. 611 - Mode and order of interrogation and presentation; 
UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(2) - Admission by party-opponent, 
UTAH R. EVID. 803(3) - Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition; 
UTAH R. EVID. 804(b)(3) - Statement against interest. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 20,2000, defendant Jose Cnxz-Meza stabbed his girlfriend, Angie Zabriskie, 
to death (R. 300-317; R.433: 7-8). Four days later, he was charged with murder (R. 5-7). 
Following preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial (R. 80-81; R.432:7-143). 
Both parties filed numerous pretrial motions, but only one pretrial ruling is at issue 
on appeal: the trial court's grant of the State's Motion In Limine to Exclude Hearsay 
Statements (R. 110-15, 205-25, 379-85). In granting the State's motion, the trial court 
concluded that defendant's out-of-court inculpatory statements to a former girlfriend, Bonnie 
Santa-Cruz, made a few hours after his current girlfriend Angie's murder, constituted 
admissions of a party-opponent and were adlmissible non-hearsay (R.431: 39-40). The court 
concluded, however, that defendant's other out-of-court statements to Bonnie were 
inadmissible hearsay in that the statements; were self-serving, uncorroborated, and lacked 
reliability (R. 379-85; R.431:38-40). See Addendum B (Preliminary Hearing Testimony of 
Bonnie Santa-Cruz) & Addendum C (Trial Court fs Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
2 
Re: State's Motion in Limine to Exclude Hearsay Statements). Nevertheless, while the self-
serving statements constituted inadmissible hearsay if testified to by Bonnie at trial, no 
restriction was placed on defendant's right to fully testify on his own behalf or otherwise 
present admissible evidence relevant to his defense at trial (R. 113; R.431: 34-35, 39-40). 
Defendant pled guilty to murder conditioned upon his right to appeal the grant of the 
State's Motion to Exclude (R. 369-78; R.433:3-12). See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935,938-39 
(Utah App. 1988); UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 1 l(i). On March 26, 2001, he was sentenced to 
imprisonment for five-years-to-life (R. 389).1 He timely appealed (R. 417-18,423). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial court called Angie Zabriskie's death a "senseless, brutal murder" (R.434: 
12). The events leading up to it began the night before.2 
Angie was separated from her husband and having an affair with defendant (R.434: 
1
 Defendant incorrectly lists William Barrett as the presiding judge. See Brief of 
Appellant [Br.Aplt] at 1 and brief cover. Judge Barrett was the preliminary hearing 
magistrate (R. 80-81,432). Judge Judith Atherton ruled on the pretrial motion, accepted 
defendant's guilty plea, and sentenced him (R. 369, 385-89,431-34). 
2
 In his Statement of Facts, see Br.Aplt at 4-8, defendant relates the basic facts, but 
minimizes their import and refuses to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the 
prosecution. This is improper. A trial court's decision to exclude a defendant's self-
serving statements is fact-sensitive. See Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 13 (recognizing that the 
decision to admit inculpatory and exclude exculpatory statements "required factual 
findings as to the nature, content, and timing of the statements"). Consequently, a 
defendant is obligated to marshal the evidence in support of the decision. See State v. 
Widdison, 2001 UT 60,160,28 P.3d 1278. Yet, here, defendant barely acknowledges 
the trial court's ruling and completely ignores the court's findings. See Br.Aplt at 3-4. 
The State, therefore, presents the record facts in the light most favorable to the grant of its 
motion. 
3 
5). She and her young son were living in an apartment in South Salt Lake (R.432: 15). 
Defendant often stayed there (R.432: 134). 
On May 19,2002, the night before her murder, Angie told her estranged husband that 
she was going to tell defendant the affair was over (R.434: 6).3 
Around 8:00 p.m. that night, a neighbor heard Angie and a man, who the neighbor 
believed was defendant, arguing loudly below the neighbor's window (R.432: 136). Angie 
was angry at her son and defendant told her to leave him alone (id.). Twice during the 45-
minute argument, defendant angrily yelled, "I'm going to kill you" (R.432:136-137). Angie 
replied, "Just take me to the train station" (R.432: 136).4 
Early the next morning, defendant stole Angie's car which was parked at the 
3
 Angie's husband did not testify at the preliminary hearing, but provided this 
information during the sentencing proceeding (R.434: 5-7). Consequently, the trial court 
did not consider it in rendering its pretrial ruling. 
4
 Defendant claims on appeal that Angie was prone to "rages" and "uproarious, 
vicious arguments with people" (BrAplt. at 9, 26, 28-29, & 31). The record belies the 
claim. The neighbor testified that she never heard Angie screaming prior to the 19th 
(R.432: 140). Bonnie Santa-Cruz testified that defendant told her that he and Angie 
"fought a lot," but Bonnie had no personal knowledge of the nature of the fights or who 
was the aggressor (R.432: 93). At sentencing, Angie's estranged husband explained that 
Angie had twice sought protective orders against defendant, but then failed to finalize the 
orders out of fear that defendant would retaliate against her family (R.434: 6). 
Defendant also claims that "it is unlikely" that the man arguing with Angie was 
defendant because, according to the neighbor, the man did not have an accent and spoke 
English (Br.Aplt at 8 & 29 n.30). Nevertheless, the neighbor identified the voice as 
defendant's based on her prior, albeit brief, encounters with him and because he was the 
only man staying at the apartment (R.432: 136-37, 139-41). If defendant had proceeded 
to trial, he could have challenged this testimony. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^  14, 
10 P.3d 346. Here, however, defendant's guilty plea did not preserve a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence (R. 378). 
4 
apartment (R.432: 82, 121-22). He left the parking lot so quickly that the car's tires 
screeched and the end of the car fish-tailed (R.432: 120-27). The driver of another vehicle 
worried that defendant might hit him (R.432: 123). The two cars passed close to each other 
and the driver noticed something red, possibly clothing, next to defendant (R.432:127,130).6 
Defendant drove from South Salt Lake to Pleasant Grove where his former girlfriend, 
Bonnie Santa-Cruz, lived with her mother and defendant's son (R.432:59).7 Bonnie was not 
there, but her mother and son were (id.). Bonnie's mother thought defendant had been 
drinking, but did not smell alcohol on him (R.432: 60,65). She sensed that defendant "was 
in trouble" and had done something "wrong," perhaps fought with "his girl" (R.432:60,63). 
When defendant began gesturing, rather than speaking, Bonnie's mother assumed he did not 
want his son, who was nearby, to hear (R.432: 60, 62). From the gestures, the mother 
concluded that defendant had "hurt" someone (R.432:63). When defendant asked for money 
5
 The record establishes that after killing Angie, defendant stole her vehicle 
(R.432: 82,121-22). Defendant considered fleeing to Mexico and obtained money for 
new tires (R.432: 63, 90). Defendant only minimally acknowledges these 
facts—referring to the car as defendant's and stating that he "borrowed" it (BrAplt at 5). 
6
 After killing Angie, defendant washed blood off himself in her bathroom (R.432: 
33-34). He removed his bloody clothing, including his shoes which had left prints in the 
hallway (R.432: 27-28). He changed into clean clothes, but remained shoeless (R.432: 
42,44-45, 84). See Addendum C at 383. Defendant fails to marshal these facts. 
7
 Defendant repeatedly misrepresents that Bonnie is defendant's "former wife" 
(Br.Aplt. at 5-5, & 12). Defendant and Bonnie lived together from 1994 until February 
1999 (R.432: 72-73). Nevertheless, defense counsel tried to preclude Bonnie from 
testifying at the preliminary hearing by asserting that in May 2000, she had a common-
law relationship with defendant (R.432: 68-69). The magistrate disagreed (R.432: 69-70). 
The trial court referred to Bonnie as the mother of defendant's child (R. 381). Defendant 
fails to marshal these facts. 
5 
because he said "his" car tires were "no good," she gave him $50.00 (id.). 
Defendant subsequently drove to Home Depot on 90th South State and Redwood Road 
where Bonnie worked (R.432: 75-76). He went into the store and asked if he could speak 
to her (R.432: 78). The two got into Angie's car in the parking lot (R.432: 79-80). See 
Addendum C at 381 & 383 (finding that defendant met with Bonnie "hours after the killing, 
and after he had had [sic] a great deal of time for reflective thought"). 
Like her mother, Bonnie could tell that something was wrong and also wondered if 
defendant had been drinking, but could not smell any alcohol on him even though defendant 
had a beer in his hand (R.432: 78-79, 88,97).8 Bonnie asked several times what was wrong 
(R.432: 83, 98). Defendant responded that he had just seen their son (R.432: 82). After 
several minutes of prodding from Bonnie, defendant told her he had killed Angie (R.432:83, 
98). See Addendum Cat 383-84 (finding that defendant's discussion of the killing was "not 
made spontaneously while defendant was still under the stress of excitement caused by a 
startling event").9 
8
 Similar beer bottles were found discarded on the outside steps to Angie's 
apartment and in her car after defendant's arrest (R.432: 12, 50). Defendant's blood 
alcohol level at the time of the murder is unknown because he was not arrested until hours 
later (R.432: 40-41). 
9
 Below, defendant argued that his statements to Bonnie constituted excited 
utterances under rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 209-11; R.432: 31-32). The 
court disagreed (R. 383-84), and defendant has abandoned argument on appeal. 
Nevertheless, the court's findings concerning the circumstances of the conversation 
remain relevant to its determination that defendant's self-serving statements were 
uncorroborated and unreliable. See Parker, 2000 UT 51, U 13. 
6 
Bonnie did not believe him and asked if he meant they had a fight (R.432: 84). 
Defendant insisted he had killed Angie (id.). Defendant reached in his pocket, pulled out a 
knife, opened it, and displayed its bloody blade (R.432: 85-87). Defendant said, "This is 
what I used to kill her" (R.432: 85). Bonnie looked for any injuries or blood on defendant, 
but saw none (R.432: 84-85).10 
Bonnie continued to question defendant (R.432: 84). He told her that Angie would 
not let him see his son and had accused him of really wanting to see Bonnie (R.432: 98). 
Defendant told Bonnie that Angie pointed a gun at him and threatened to shoot him if he left 
the apartment (R.432: 89,98-99). See Addendum C at 384 (findings and conclusions that 
defendant's self-serving statements to Bonnie alleging that the victim had a gun and had 
threatened him were not corroborated "by any evidence," were not spontaneous, and did "not 
bear any of the indicia of reliability . . . which would override the fact that such statements 
are hearsay"). 
Defendant claimed he responded, "Please, Angie, I want to go see my son. I'm asking 
you again, I want to go see my son" (R.432: 99). Defendant told Bonnie, "That's when [I] 
took out the knife, turned around and looked at [Angie] and says, 'Okay, let's see who wins'" 
(R.432: 89, 99). 
Defendant won. He stabbed Angie 15 times and inflicted 9 incised wounds (R.432: 
10
 Defendant had no injuries at the time of his arrest except for a small cut on his 
right ring finger and a few scrapes on his right bicep (R.432: 45). 
7 
107).!l Five of the stab wounds were lethal (id.). Defendant inflicted "multiple stab 
wounds" to Angie's head, neck, torso, and left lower leg (R.432: 107-08). The stab wounds 
penetrated her calvarium and left brain, transected her left jugular vein, caused extensive 
injury of the musculature of her left neck, penetrated her trachea, perforated the left lobe of 
her liver, injured her spleen and stomach, and wounded her right arm and hand (R. 300-17; 
R.432:107-08). Bleeding was extensive (id.). See Medical Examiner's Report (R. 300-17). 
The exact time of Angie's death is unknown, but when the police discovered her body 
in the kitchen of her apartment at 11:20 a.m. on May 20th, it was "cold to the touch" (R.432: 
14,18). The body was on the floor under the kitchen table (R.432:10,13,25). The face and 
head were completely covered with blood (R.432: 30). Blood "splotches" were 
"everywhere," including on the wall behind the body (R.432:13,30). Blood was also on the 
top of the kitchen table, "smeared in a pattern indicating that a hand on been placed on top 
of the blood and then pulled back"(R.432: 29). Kitchen chairs "were strewn everywhere" 
(R.432: 13, 29). A planter was knocked over next to the body (R.432: 13). The telephone 
was pulled from its cord; the cord, still attached to the wall, was "wrapped up" in Angie's 
hand, with the detached telephone a foot or so away on the floor (R.432:13,31). Shoe prints 
led from the kitchen, down the hallway, and into the bathroom (R.432: 27-28). The 
bathroom had blood stains mixed with water on the counter and sink (R.432: 33-34). Red 
splatters were on the bathroom floor, inside the bathtub/shower, and on the wall near the 
11
 "A stab wound is a penetrating sharp force injury that is deeper than it is long; 
an incised wound is a sharp force injury that is longer than it is deep" (R.432: 107). 
8 
bathroom mirror (id.). Red splotches trailed up the stairs outside the basement apartment 
(R.432: 12, 24). 
Defendant did not share these details with Bonnie. All Bonnie knew is what 
defendant told her—that Angie had allegedly threatened defendant with a gun and he had 
"protected" himself with his knife (R.432: 89). Bonnie asked defendant where the gun was 
(R.432:99). He did not tell her (id.). Bonnie encouraged him to turn himself in to the police 
(R.432: 99-100). She told him that he could explain to the police that he had acted in self-
defense and turn over the gun or, at least, tell the police where it was (id.). Defendant did 
not respond other than to cry and say he loved Bonnie and their son (id.). He said he was 
confused and might go to Mexico (R.432:90). He asked Bonnie if she still wore a necklace 
he had given her and said she should always remember he loved her (R.432: 100). As 
Bonnie returned to work, he asked her for cigarette money and she gave him five or six 
dollars (R.432: 90). 
Defendant called Bonnie at work and his son in Pleasant Grove several times that day 
(R.432: 40, 77-78). Eventually, the police tracked one of the calls to a telephone in Payson 
and arrested defendant (R.432:41). He no longer had the bloody knife (R.432:49). No gun 
was found in Angie's apartment or car and, other than defendant's assertion to Bonnie, there 
is no evidence that Angie possessed or threatened defendant with a gun (R.432:16,30,88).l2 
12
 Nevertheless, defendant opines that Angie—after suffering 15 stab wounds— 
may have "disposed" of the gun and that is why no gun was found (BrAplt. at 30). The 
claim exemplifies defendant's failure to properly marshal the evidence or acknowledge 
the court's findings. Similarly, defendant infers that Bonnie once saw a gun belonging to 
9 
See Addendum C at 384 (finding that defendant's "claim that the victim possessed a gun is 
uncorroborated by any evidence"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that it violates common law evidentiary principles and constitutional 
due process to admit his inculpatory statements to Bonnie Santa-Cruz, while excluding his 
contemporaneous self-serving and uncorroborated hearsay statements. Defendant asserts that 
if his oral admissions are reliable, any other contemporaneous oral statements—regardless 
of their character or factual circumstances—must also be reliable. The argument is without 
merit. 
Evidentiary claims are governed by the Utah Rules of Evidence. The rules recognize 
that admissions of a party-opponent are inherently reliable and, therefore, admissible as non-
hearsay. See UTAH R. EVID. 801 (d)(2). At the same time, the rules classify out-of-court self-
serving statements as hearsay. See UTAH R. EVID. 801(C). If the hearsay statements 
minimize or exonerate a defendant's criminal culpability, the rules prohibit their admission 
unless "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." 
See UTAH R. EVID. 804(b)(3). 
Angie and that Angie had access to a gun {BrAplt. at 7, 30), Again, this is not an 
accurate representation of the record evidence. Bonnie testified that she never saw the 
victim with a gun (R.432: 102). A year before the murder—apparently months before 
defendant lived with Angie—Bonnie saw defendant with a gun (R.432: 74, 92, 101-02). 
On another occasion, sometime prior to the murder, Bonnie testified that defendant said 
Angie wanted a gun for protection from her "enemies" (R.432: 96). At sentencing, 
Angie's husband revealed that Angie did not like guns and would not permit them in her 
home(R.434: 10). 
10 
Here, the trial court assessed the facts and determined that defendant's statements to 
Bonnie concerning the victim's alleged threats were not corroborated. Additionally, the 
court found that the out-of-court statements had no indicia of reliability. Consequently, the 
court ruled that if Bonnie testified at trial, she could not testify to defendant's hearsay 
statements. Defendant, however, could testify on his own behalf. 
The trial court's ruling accords with the Utah Rules of Evidence and, consequently, 
the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Bonnie's testimony. Moreover, because the 
ruling did not restrict defendant's own testimony or his ability to present relevant admissible 
evidence, the ruling comports with due process. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT FULLY CONSIDERED THE FACTS AND 
PROPERLY APPLIED ESTABLISHED RULES OF EVIDENCE; 
CONSEQUENTLY, IT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
RESTRICTING BONNIE SANTA-CRUZ FROM TESTIFYING TO 
DEFENDANTS SELF-SERVING, UNCORROBORATED, AND 
UNRELIABLE HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
Defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to admit his post-crime self-serving 
statements to his ex-girlfriend, Bonnie Santa-Cruz, concerning threats that he claims were 
made by his current girlfriend, Angie Zabriskie, the deceased victim. First, defendant argues 
that the common law rule of oral completeness is still viable in Utah {BrAplt. at 16). 
Defendant claims that the "completeness" rule mandates that if his non-hearsay oral 
admissions are admitted into evidence, any contemporaneous out-of-court oral statements 
must also be admitted, even if the remaining statements would otherwise be inadmissible 
11 
under the Utah Rules of Evidence (Br.Aplt. at 12-26). Second, defendant asserts that 
excluding his self-serving out-of-court statements deprives him of due process by impairing 
his defense of extreme emotional disturbance {Br.Aplt. at 26-32). While defendant claims 
that his self-serving statements are admissible under the state of mind exception to the 
hearsay rule, see UTAH R. EVID. 803(3), he asserts that even if the statements were 
inadmissible, due process compels their admission in this case (Br.Aplt. at 10; R.431:32-33). 
Defendant is incorrect. 
(A) The Common Law "Rule of Completeness" Does Not Control This Case. 
The common law doctrine of completeness, also called the "rule of completeness," 
required that "[i]n evidencing the tenor of an utterance material or relevant, made in words, 
whether written or oral, in original or in copy, the whole of the utterance on a single topic or 
transaction must be taken together." 21 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth A. Grahman, Jr. 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 5072 (5th Ed.). The doctrine arose out of procedural 
concerns for the timing and sequence for the introduction of evidence, but was predicated on 
the concept of "fairness." See State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, f 46,993 P.2d 232 (citing 
United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 728 (5th Cir. 1996), cert, denied, 520 U.S. 1185 
(1997)). The common law doctrine recognized that since a party was obligated to present 
evidence in support of its own contentions, but not required to present evidence favorable to 
its opponent, the introduction of a statement out of context could, at times, "so prejudice the 
opponent that he could not hope to repair the damage during his presentation of evidence. 
Better yet, it might be that the evidence aeeded to put the statement in context was not 
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available to the opponent or was inadmissible in his hands." Wright, Federal Practice § 
5072. As a result, the common law doctrine of completeness required, in the interest of 
fairness, that the whole of a written or oral statement be introduced at the same time that a 
party offered any part of the statement. Id. Prior to the adoption of uniform evidentiary 
rules, Utah recognized the common law doctrine. See State v. Dunkley, 39 P.2d 1097,1109 
(Utah 1935); State v. Greene, 115 P. 181, 187 (Utah 1910). 
Today, rule 106 of the Utah Rules of Evidence expresses the common law doctrine 
of completeness in modified form. See Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, f 43 (citing Beech 
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1988)). Rule 106 reads: 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by 
a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
See Addendum A. Unlike the common law doctrine, which governed both written and oral 
statements, rule 106 applies only to written or recorded statements. See Leleae, 1999 UT 
App 368, f 44 (recognizing that while oral statements are excluded from rule 106, recordings 
of oral statements fall within the rule, citing Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah 
Evidence Law 1-32 (1996)). See also 1972 Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. EVID. 106 
("For practical reasons, the rule is limited to writings and recorded statements and does not 
apply to conversations.").13 
Rules 106 of the state and federal rules are identical. See Advisory Note, UTAH 
R. EVID. 106; FEDERAL R. EVID. 106 {Addendum A). 
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Defendant concedes that rule 106 does not apply to the oral statements at issue in this 
case (Br.Aplt. at 16). Nevertheless, relying on cases which predate the adoption of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence, defendant contends that "[i]n Utah, the common law rule of completeness 
remains in effect" such that the admission of "conversations and oral statements"are "left to 
the purview of the common law" {Br.Aplt. at 75-7 6).l4 
Defendant is incorrect. The Utah Rules of Evidence, like their federal counterparts, 
supersede common law doctrine and prior evidentiary standards. See Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1993) ("In principle, under the Federal 
Rules no common law evidence remains In reality, of course, the body of common law 
knowledge continues to exist, though in the somewhat altered form of a source of guidance 
in the exercise of delegated powers."); Preliminary Note, UTAH R. EviD. ("Any existing 
statutes inconsistent with these rules, if and when these rules are adopted by the Supreme 
Court, will be impliedly repealed [T]hese rules, as with the Federal Rules of Evidence 
on which they are based, . . . supply a fresh starting place for the law of evidence^]"); 
Advisory Committee, Note, UTAH R. EviD. 101 ("Rule 101 adopts a general policy making 
the Rules of Evidence applicable in all instances in courts of the state including situations 
previously governed by statute, except to the extent that specific statutory provisions are 
14
 In support, defendant cites Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694 (1897), 
Dunkley, 39 P.2d 1097, State v. Romeo, 128 P. 530 (Utah 1912), and Greene, 115 P. 181, 
all of which substantially predate the implementation of the federal evidentiary rules in 
1975 and the state evidentiary rules in 1983. Because the cases predate the existing rules, 
they do not control. 
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expressly retained. . . . The position of the court [in prior Utah case law] that statutory 
provisions of evidence law inconsistent with the rules will take precedence is rejected."). 
Consequently, while common law may provide interpretative guidance, the explicit 
provisions of the evidentiary rules control.15 
Defendant appears to admit as much, although he misapprehends its effect (Br.Aplt. 
at 23 n.22). He argues that the common law doctrine of oral completeness, while excluded 
from rule 106, is implicitly incorporated in rule 611, Utah Rules of Evidence (Br.Aplt. at 23-
24). A handful of jurisdictions agree, but no Utah authority supports or compels such an 
expansive reading of rule 611. In any event, rule 611 does not require admission of 
defendant's self-serving statements here. 
Patterned on an identical federal rule, Utah rule 611(a) reads: 
Control by court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode 
and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make 
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, 
(2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment. 
See Addendum A. The rule places the "ultimate responsibility for the effective working of 
15
 This is not to say that a particular rule of evidence may not reflect common law 
principles. For example, the recognition that admissions of a party-opponent are 
admissible is an "age-old common law" tenet. See State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1164 
(Utah 1980) (commenting on prior UTAH R. EVID. 63(7), which in substance is identical 
to current UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(2)). See also Ronald N. Boyce & Edward L. Kimball 
Utah Rules of Evidence - Part III 1995 Utah L. Rev. 717, 718-21 (recognizing that the 
Utah rules' approach to hearsay is consistent with much of the common law approach). 
But, unless specifically recognized in a rule, see, e.g., UTAH R. EVID. 501 (governing 
privileges), pre-existing evidentiary standards have no force. See Advisory Note, UTAH 
R.EVID. 101. 
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the adversary system" on the trial judge by allowing her to control the form and order of 
calling witnesses and presenting evidence. 1972 Advisory Note, FEDERAL R. EVID. 611. 
While rule 611 "restates in broad terms the power and obligation of the judge as developed 
under common law principles," the rule leaves resolution of the procedural questions which 
arise at trial to the trial "judge's common sense and fairness in view of the particular 
circumstances." Id. 
Because rule 611 permits a judge to be guided by "fairness" in controlling a trial, 
defendant extrapolates that the rule must necessarily recognize the doctrine of oral 
completeness (Br.Aplt. 23-24). In support, defendant extensively relies on a Texas law 
review article, which encourages an expansive reading of federal rule 611, but ultimately 
proposes amending federal rule 106 to include out-of-court oral statements (Br.Aplt. at 13-
17). The article is not controlling. 
Defendant also cites Dunkley and Romeo to support his expansive reading of rule 611 
{Br.Aplt at 15-16,19-27). But in 1935 and 1912, the respective years of the Utah decisions, 
Utah had no codified evidentiary rules; instead, we followed common law principles which 
included the doctrine of oral completeness. See Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1109; Romeo, 128 P. 
at 536. Because the standard was settled, Dunkley, 39 P.2d at 1108-09, and Romeo, 128 P. 
at 535-36, simply addressed how a jury should weigh inculpatory and exculpatory portions 
of a confession once it was admitted into evidence. The decisions provide no guidance in 
interpreting current evidentiary standards. 
Defendant's only other Utah authority regarding the scope of rule 611 is Kimball's 
16 
and Boyce's commentary on the then-newly implemented Utah Rules of Evidence (Br.Aplt. 
at 23) (citing Utah Evidence Law at 1-32 & 1-33). After the commentators noted that the 
new rules only partially adopted the doctrine of completeness in rule 106, they suggest that 
in "an unusual case" a party "might succeed to appeal to the court's authority under Rule 
611" to obtain inclusion of all portions of an oral statement. Id. at 1-33. As support, they 
cite dicta from two federal cases.16 Id. n. 129. At the same time, the commentators explained 
that if an entire oral statement were to be admitted under an expansive reading of rule 611, 
the remaining portions of the oral communication should only be admitted for "the sake of 
completeness" so that the jury could "understand the meaning of the evidence first admitted," 
and not for "its truth." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, however, 
defendant seeks to introduce the statements for their truth. See discussion, infra at 28-33. 
A few courts have expansively read federal rule 611, or a rule like it, as incorporating 
the concept of oral completeness. See, e.g., United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614,621 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (recognizing and approving of cases in which "Fed. R. Evid. 611(a) has been read 
to impose the same fairness standard [found in Fed. R. Evid. 106] upon conversations"); 
United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325,329 (7th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Mussaleen, 35 
F.3d 692, 696 (2nd Cir. 1994) (same); State v. Eugenio, 579 N.W.2d 642, 650 (Wis. 1998) 
16
 Defendant cites one of the cases, United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th 
Cir. 1986), but fails to acknowledge that the court's discussion concerning the scope of 
the rules is dictum (Br.Aplt. at 12 & 15). See LeFevour, 798 F.2d at 981 (recognizing 
that federal rule 106 controlled resolution of the case because the statement at issue was a 
recording). 
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(same in connection with similar Wisconsin rule). Nevertheless, the decisions recognize that 
the rule of completeness—whether limited to documents and recordings under rule 106, or 
to oral conversations under an expansive reading of rule 611—"should not be viewed as an 
unbridled opportunity to open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence." Eugenio, 579 
N.W.2d at 651. See also Commonwealth v. Watson, 388 N.E.2d 680, 691 (Mass. 1979) 
(recognizing that even under a common law rule of completeness, there must be some basis 
for the admission of self-serving statements "other than the fact that they were uttered as a 
part of another statement which has been offered into evidence"). Accord Barbara E. 
Bergman & Nancy Hollander, Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol I, §4:10at 319 (15th Ed,) 
(recognizing that the majority of federal circuits do not interpret the concept of completeness 
found in rule 106 to "make something admissible that should be excluded"); J. Weinstein 
& M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, Vol 1, f 106[02] at 106-12 (1985) (recognizing that 
rule 106 addresses only an order of proof problem and does not make admissible what is 
otherwise inadmissible).17 
Similarly, even when some version of the doctrine of completeness applies—whether 
to documents and recordings through rule 106, or to oral conversations through an expansive 
17
 See also Phoenix Associates III v. Stone, 60 F.3d 95, 103 (2nd Cir. 1995) ("Rule 
106 does not compel admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence.") (citation 
and quotation marks omitted); United States v. Wilkerson, 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir. 
1996) (recognizing that rule 106 does "not render admissible the evidence which 
otherwise is inadmissible under hearsay rules"), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 934 (1997); 
United States v. Woolbright, 831 F.2d 1390, 1395 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that neither rule 
106 or rule 611 authorizes a court to admit unexcepted hearsay). 
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reading of rule 611—it is universally recognized that "a trial court 'need admit only those 
portions of a statement relevant and necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context the 
portion already introduced.'" See Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, § 43 (quoting Branch, 91 F.3d 
at 728, and recognizing limitation in context of rule 106) (citation and quotation marks 
omitted)). See also Commonwealth v. Henry, 640 N.E.2d 503, 506 (Mass. App. 1994) 
(recognizing the same limitation in the context of a state rule of oral completeness because 
otherwise, a defendant could introduce "any amount of self-serving statements... at his own 
option") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Under any theory of completeness, a claim that an omitted statement explains or 
places in context the admitted portion will be closely scrutinized. See Eugenio, 579 N. W.2d 
at 651 (recognizing that even under an expansive reading of rule 611, a trial court "must 
closely scrutinize the proffered additional statements to avert abuse of the rule"). See also 
Li, 55 F.3d at 330 (holding that admission of Li's oral inculpatory statement that he paid a 
kickback, did not require, even under an expansive interpretation of rule 611, the inclusion 
of Li's contemporaneous explanation that he only paid the kickback because he was 
threaten); Range, 94 F.3d at 621 (even under an expansive reading of rule 611, fairness did 
not require the admission of Range's self-serving statement that someone else placed the gun 
in his vehicle; the explanation was not necessary to explain or put in context his admission 
that he knew the gun was in the car); Henry, 640 N.E.2d at 506-07 (holding that Henry's 
exculpatory statements were not admissible under a state rule of completeness because the 
explanations simply explained why he did the admitted act). Compare United States v. 
19 
Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that while "[o]rdinarily a defendant's 
self-serving, exculpatory out of court statements would not be admissible," Haddad's denial 
that he knew a gun was under his bed was admissible in his gun possession trial to place in 
context his admission that he knew drugs v/ere under the bed; without the denial, the drug 
admission unfairly implied that Haddad also admitted knowing the gun was under the bed 
because the two objects were next to each other). 
In sum, a few courts recognize that, under limited circumstances, a defendant's entire 
oral statement may be admissible pursuant to rules similar to Utah rule 611. While these 
courts recognize that "fairness" may at times require "completeness," they also recognize that 
fairness is not achieved through 64untrustworthiness." No jurisdiction requires a trial court 
to admit what is otherwise inadmissible hearsay simply because the hearsay statement is 
made contemporaneously with an admissible statement. Nor does any court require a trial 
court to admit self-serving statements that are unreliable. Moreover, a rule of oral 
completeness does not diminish the trial court's discretion to exclude self-serving statements 
which have no indicia of reliability. See Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, f 45 (recognizing the 
"considerable discretion" accorded a trial court in determining "fairness" under rule 106 and 
upholding the trial court's refusal to admit a portion of a recorded statement which was 
"merely self-serving"). Accord Li, 55 F.3d at 330 (applying abuse of discretion standard to 
statements excluded under an expansive interpretation of rule 611). 
As will be more fully discussed, the trial court properly exercised its discretion and 
excluded defendant's self-serving, uncorroborated, and unreliable hearsay statements to 
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Bonnie. While the court did so pursuant to the dictates of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
result would be the same under a doctrine of oral completeness. 
(B) Established Evidentiary Rules Mandate Distinctions Between 
Inculpatory and Self-Serving Out-of-Court Statements. 
Defendant explains how he believes the Utah Rules of Evidence should read, but 
ignores how the rules do read. According to defendant, there should be no distinction 
between inculpatory admissions and non-inculpatory statements so long as the two are part 
of the same conversation {Br.Aplt at 15-16). To defendant, either all of his out-of-court 
statements to Bonnie are admissible or none are {Br.Aplt. at 23-25). Defendant is mistaken: 
controlling evidentiary rules recognize a difference in the reliability of inculpatory and self-
serving statements and, consequently, mandate a distinction in their admissibility. 
As previously discussed, the Utah Rules of Evidence control current evidentiary 
standards. See discussion, supra at 14-15. But irrespective of rule 61 Ts scope, rule 611 is 
only a general rule. More specific rules govern here, to wit, the hearsay provisions 
controlling a criminal defendant's admissions and exculpatory statements. See UTAH R. 
EVID. 801(d)(2) & 804(b) (3). See also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587-88 (recognizing that 
existing evidentiary rules supersede common law and prior evidentiary rules, and specific 
evidentiary rules govern over general rules). 
The Utah Rules of Evidence view inculpatory admissions as inherently reliable. See 
UTAH R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (classifying admissions of a party-opponent as non-hearsay) 
{Addendum A). Admissions of a party-opponent are "excluded from the category of hearsay 
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on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the result of the adversary system rather 
than satisfaction of the conditions of the hearsay rule[; as a result,] no guarantee of 
trustworthiness is required in the case of an admission." 1972 Advisory Committee Note, 
FEDERAL R. EVID. 801(d)(2).18 Consequently, the trial court correctly concluded that 
defendant's admissions to Bonnie were admissible (R.431: 39-40). Accord State v. Parker, 
2000 UT 51, Iff 14-15, 4 P.3d 778 (recognizing admissibility of inculpatory statements as 
non-hearsay). 
Self-serving statements are not admissions: "When a party offers his own out-of-court 
declaration for its truth, it is not an admission and must satisfy the hearsay rule." Boyce, 
Utah Rules of Evidence at 742. See UTAH R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (distinguishing between 
"statements against penal interest" which are inculpatory and those that are offered to 
"exculpate the accused") {Addendum A). See also Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 16 (distinguishing 
Parker's exculpatory hearsay statements from his inculpatory non-hearsay admissions). 
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, "just as at common law and under the [prior evidentiary 
rules], hearsay is inadmissible unless if falls with one of the many exceptions provided by 
the Rules themselves or by statute." Boyce; Utah Rules of Evidence at 718. See UTAH R. 
EVID. 802 (Addendum A). "Generally, the exceptions are narrow in application and 
relatively specific." Id. at 758. Foundational to all hearsay exceptions is the requirement of 
trustworthiness. See id. 
The state and federal rules are identical in pertinent part. See Addendum A. 
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Defendant ignores these elementary principles. Indeed, other than rules 106 and 611, 
defendant ignores the Utah evidentiary rules. And in advocating the doctrine of 
completeness, defendant ignores one of that doctrine's shared tenets with the evidentiary 
rules: the rule of completeness—like the existing evidentiary rules—does not require the 
admission of self-serving statements. See Branch, 91 F.3d at 728 (concluding that neither 
rule 106 nor the rule of completeness required the admission of a defendant's exculpatory 
statements explaining why he picked up and fired a weapon); Henry, 640 N.E.2d at 432 
(holding that state rule of completeness did not require the admission of Henry's explanation 
of why he fled the police because the statement was no more than a self-serving "explanation 
of why the defendant was afraid"; "[i]n the interest of completeness, a defendant cannot 
introduce any amount of self-serving statements admissible at his own option, along with a 
statement regarding his state of mind") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
The well-established reluctance to admit self-serving statements is founded in basic 
psychology: 
One of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially 
truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature. 
Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the ones which people are most likely 
to make even when they are false; and mere proximity to other, self-
inculpatory, statements does not increase the plausibility of the self-
exculpatory statements. 
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1994). Accord Lilly v. Virginia, 527 
U.S. 116,133(1999). For this reason, "non-self-inculpatory statements, even if made within 
a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory," are not generally admissible. 
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Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-601 (interpreting the statement against penal interest exception 
found in FEDERAL R. EVID. 804(b)(3)).19 Accord Watson, 388 N.W.2d at 691 (extending 
the doctrine of completeness to automatically admit exculpatory statements would 
impermissibly "permit a defendant to make a statement containing an admission and then 
load it with any amount of self-serving statements and thereby effectively preclude the 
introduction of the admission in evidence without automatically rendering all of the self-
serving statements admissible at his option"). 
In this case, the trial court was fully cognizant of the dangers of admitting self-serving 
statements. Distinguishing between defendant's inculpatory non-hearsay statements and his 
self-serving hearsay statements, the court properly concluded that defendant's hearsay 
statements were inadmissible unless they qualified for admission under an exception (R. 
379-85; R.431:38-40) {Addendum Q. Defendant argued two exceptions (R. 205-11; R.431: 
30-33). 
First, defendant argued that the statements qualified as excited utterances pursuant to 
rule 803(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 209-10; R.431: 31-32).20 The trial court disagreed 
(R. 383-84; R.431: 38). On appeal, defendant does not challenge this ruling. Nevertheless, 
the trial court's findings that defendant's conversation with Bonnie was not spontaneous and 
19
 Rule 804(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is substantially the same as the 
federal rule. See Addendum A. 
20
 See Addendum A for a copy of the rule. State v. Kaytso, 684 P.2d 63 (Utah 
1984) sets out its requirements. 
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only occurred "after he had had a great deal of time for reflective thought" remain relevant 
to its determination that the hearsay statements were uncorroborated and unreliable.21 See 
Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 16 (recognizing that in determining the admissibility of non-
inculpatory statements, "the crucial question in all cases is whether the statement was made 
while the declarant was still under the influence of the event to the extent that his statement 
could not be the result of fabrication, intervening actions, or the exercise of choice or 
judgment"). 
Below, defendant also claimed that the hearsay statements qualified for admission as 
"statements against interest" under rule 804(b)(3), Utah Rule of Evidence (R. 211). But as 
the trial court recognized, rule 804(b)(3) imposes specific reliability requirements for 
admission: 
A statement tending to expose the declarant to civil or criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating 
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(Addendum A). Based on the facts of this case, the court found that defendant's self-serving 
statements that Angie had possessed and threatened him with a gun were not corroborated 
"by any evidence," were "completely self-serving," were "not made spontaneously," and 
lacked any "indica of reliability" (R. 384) (Addendum C). Consequently, the court properly 
21
 The court found that after the murder, but before speaking to Bonnie about the 
killing, defendant "removed his shirt, put on a different one, washed up at the bathroom 
sink in Ms. Zabriskie's apartment, got into Ms. Zabriskie's car, drove to Pleasant Grove, 
visited his son, drove from Pleasant Grove to Draper, Utah, visited with Bonnie Santa-
Cruz, and conversed with her for several minutes before confessing to her that he had 
killed Angie Zabriskie" (R. 383) (Addendum Q. 
25 
ruled that the statements were inadmissible (id.). Accord State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 
1038 (Utah 1987) (affirming the trial court's exclusion of Gentry's self-serving statements 
under rule 804(b)(3) because the statements lacked corroboration). 
On appeal, defendant does not acknowledge the court's findings or marshal the 
evidence that supports them. See State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, % 60, 28 P.3d 1278 
(reaffirming the well-established marshaling requirement imposed on appellants who 
challenge a trial court's factual findings). See also Williamson, 512 U.S. at 600-01 
(recognizing the fact-sensitive nature of rule 804(b)(3)'s requirement of corroboration); 
Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 13 (recognizing the factual nature of reliability findings underlie a 
decision to exclude self-serving statements). For example, rather than marshaling the 
evidence in support of the trial court's finding that there was no evidence Angie possessed 
or threatened defendant with a gun, defendant simply extrapolates a version of the events 
favorable to himself but far beyond the record evidence.22 Compare Br.Aplt. at 26 & 28, 
with Addenda B & C(Bonnie's Testimony and Trial Court's Findings, respectively). See 
also Statement of Facts, supra at 3-10. Defendant's factual recitations do not satisfy the 
marshaling requirement. See Widdison, 2001 UT 60, % 61 (reaffirming that the marshaling 
requires more than "merely cit[ing] to portions of the testimony that favor [a defendant's] 
position). Defendant's failure to marshal the evidence permits this Court to summarily 
22
 The court found defendant had no injuries on him evidencing a struggle and 
failed to show Bonnie the gun when she asked where it was (R. 382). Additionally, no 
gun was found in Angie's apartment or car, and no bullet holes were in the apartment (R. 
380 & 382) (Addendum Q. 
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affirm the trial court's ruling. See id. 
Even if the merits are considered, the evidence amply supports the trial court's 
findings that defendant's self-serving hearsay did not qualify as a statement against interest 
because it was non-inculpatory and not corroborated or otherwise reliable. See Statement of 
Facts, supra at 3-10. Accord Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1038 (upholding the trial court's exclusion 
of Gentry's uncorroborated statement to a third person that Gentry had prior sexual activity 
with the victim); Commonwealth v. Hearn, 583 N.E.2d 279, 282 (Mass. App. 1991) 
(recognizing that while the defendant's out-of-court statement that he shot the victim 
accidently was helpful to his defense, the self-serving statement was inadmissible because 
it was not corroborated), cert, denied, 588 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1992). See also Boyce, Utah 
Rules of Evidence at 812 ("The corroboration must relate to the truthfulness of the particular 
statement and not simply be other evidence that is similarly exculpatory."). Consequently, 
defendant's non-inculpatory statements to Bonnie failed to meet the requirements of rule 
804(b)(3), and the trial court was within its discretion to exclude them. See Parker, 2000 UT 
51, %f 16-17 (affirming the trial court's discretion to exclude Parker's post-crime exculpatory 
statements to a third party where the court found the statements were made after reflective 
thought and had no indicia of reliability); Leleae, 1999 UT App368, f 45 (upholding the trial 
court's discretion to exclude portions of Leleae's post-crime recorded statement that were 
"merely self-serving"). 
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(C) Defendant Retained the Right to Present His Defense Through His Own 
Testimony or the Presentation of Any Other Relevant Admissible Evidence; 
Therefore, the Trial Court's Ruling Excluding Hearsay Did Not Violate Due 
Process. 
Below, defendant briefly alluded to a third hearsay exception which he claimed 
justified the admission of his self-serving statements. Defendant argued that his statements 
to Bonnie concerning Angie's alleged threats were admissible because the threats established 
that he was under "extreme emotional distress" when he killed Angie, a defense which could 
reduce murder to manslaughter if believed (R. 211; R.431: 30-31). Defendant claimed that 
admission of the hearsay was "critical" to his defense and, therefore, its exclusion violated 
federal due process (R. 211). On appeal, he repeats this argument (BrAplt. at 2, 26-31)?1 
The claim is without merit. Defendant's non-inculpatory statements do not qualify 
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 While defendant told Bonnie that he took his knife out "as protection" (R.432 at 
89), he does not assert self-defense. Instead, at the motion hearing and now on appeal, 
defendant claims that he acted under "extreme emotional disturbance" as a result of 
Angie's "drug-and-alcohol-induced fit of temper" and that "brow-beaten and threatened, 
he simply fought back" {BrAplt. at 26, 28, 29-30; R.431: 30-31). 
In support, defendant refers to a toxicology report which revealed that, at the time 
of her death, Angie's blood-alcohol level was twice the legal limit and evidenced ingested 
cocaine (BrAplt at 26, 28). Bonnie testified that defendant admitted that, in the past, he 
had joined the victim in "shooting up" and that defendant and Angie drank every week-
end (R.432: 95-96). The trial court ruled, in connection with a pretrial motion distinct 
from the motion at issue on appeal, that the victim's toxicology levels were irrelevant to 
defendant's claim that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance and, therefore, 
inadmissible "at this point" (R.431: 24). The court, nevertheless, informed the parties 
that it would take the matter under advisement and reconsider its ruling based on the trial 
evidence (id.). Defendant's conditional guilty plea did not reserve his right to challenge 
the pretrial exclusion of the toxicology results (R. 378), and therefore, defendant's 
reliance on this information is inappropriate. See Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ | 61. 
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for admission under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule. Moreover, irrespective 
of the statements' admissibility, defendant retained the right to present his defense through 
his own testimony or the presentation of other admissible relevant evidence (R. 113; R.431: 
34-35, 39-40). The court's ruling, therefore, did not violate due process. 
Rule 803(3), Utah Rules of Evidence, reads: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant 
is available as a witness: 
(3) Then existing mental emotional, or physical condition. A statement 
of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, 
identification, or terms of declarant's will. 
{Addendum A).2* The rule has several components. 
First, the statement must reveal the declarant's state of mind: a defendant may not 
establish his state of mind through the victim's statements. See Michael H. Graham, 3 
Handbook of Federal Evidence § 803.3 (5th Ed.) ("Rule 803(3) does not authorize receipt 
of a statement by one person as proof of another's state of mind.") (citation and quotation 
marks omitted); Boyce, Utah Rules of Evidence at 772 ("An accused may offer his own 
declaration as evidence of his state of mind."); State v. Auble, 754 P.2d 935,937 (Utah 1988) 
(recognizing that rule 803(3) does not permit a jury to use a victim's statements to "form 
conclusions about the defendant's intentions") For example, in United States v. Rodriguez-
Pando, 841 F.2d 1014,1016 (10th Cir. 1988), defendant Pando told a police officer that he 
24
 Again, the federal rule is identical. See Addendum A. 
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committed the crime because he was threatened. Pando then attempted to have the 
exculpatory statements—the third party threats he repeated to the officer—admitted to show 
his state of mind. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of 
the hearsay pursuant to rule 803(3): 
Pando argues that the tape recording [of his statement to the police] was 
admissible because it was not offered to prove that someone was going to kill 
him and his family, but rather to show his state of mind. It is true that the tape 
was not offered to prove that someone was actually going to kill Pando. 
However, we agree with the district court's implicit determination that the 
matter asserted in the tape was that Pando had been threatened. Thus, the tape 
was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and was therefore hearsay. 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in so holding. 
Here we do not have the defendant testifying about matters within his 
personal knowledge, the words of Mr. X [the individual who allegedly made 
the threats]. Rather, we have what amounts to an offer of proof that a third 
party heard the defendant describe the words of Mr. X. This certainly seems 
to be an attempt to establish by heairsay that those words were spoken. The 
issue in this case then is not whether Pando could testify as to the out-of-court 
statement of the person who threatened him. The question is whether the jury 
may hear a tape recording of Pando's out-of-court repetition of the threat. 
Id. at 1018 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in State v. Butler, 560 P.2d 1136,1139 (Utah 
1977), this Court recognized that Butler could not use threats allegedly made by the deceased 
victim to explain Butler's state of mind in confronting victim. The victim's statements only 
demonstrated the victim's state of mind, not defendant's. Id. 
Here, defendant claims that the victim's alleged threats caused him such distress that 
he "reasonably" stabbed her (BrAplt. at 28). The court did not restrict defendant's right to 
take the stand and testify to any relevant information of which he had personal knowledge 
(R. 113; R.431: 34-35,39-40). The court's ruling only limited Bonnie's testimony. In doing 
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so, the court guaranteed that defendant's self-serving assertions would be subject to 
traditional truth-finding procedures. See Rodriguez-?ando, 841 F.2d at 1018-19 ("There is 
a great difference between what the defendant would testify, and what the third party would 
testify that the defendant said out of court, in terms of fair opportunity to test the truth of 
defendant's declaration that someone actually uttered the threatening words."). 
Rule 803(3)'s second component is that the statement sought to be admitted must 
establish the declarant's "then-existing" state of mind. Statements made after a crime which 
merely reflect a defendant's "memory or belief of his feelings during the crime are not 
admissible. 
The essence of the state of mind exception is that there are circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness attendant to a statement that reflect a then 
existing mental, emotional, or physical condition Statements relating to a 
person's state of mind have probative value mainly because the declarant has 
no chance to reflect upon and perhaps misrepresent his situation. 
Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d at 1019 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, the trial 
court did not specifically rule on the state of mind exception, but concluded that the 
statements defendant attributed to Angie did not fall "within any [hearsay] exception" (R. 
384). In reaching this conclusion, the court found that defendant's statements to Bonnie were 
not spontaneous, but made hours after the murder, giving defendant "a great deal of time for 
reflective thought" (R. 383-84). This finding negates the "then-existing" requirement of rule 
803(3). 
Third, to be admitted under rule 803(3), the out-of-court statement must be reliable. 
See State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1228 (Utah 1989) (recognizing reliability requirement 
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of rule 803(3)); State v. Anderson, 51 P.3d 179,185 (Wash. App. 2002) (establishing nine-
point test for determining reliability of statement under state of mind exception). Moreover, 
deference is accorded a trial court's assessment of reliability due to its fact-sensitive nature. 
Parker, 2000 UT 51, % 13. 
Here, the court concluded that defendant's statements concerning Angie's alleged 
threats were not reliable because they were totally self-serving and lacked any corroboration 
(R. 383-84). That finding is fully supported by the record.25 See Statement of Facts, supra 
at 3-10. Additionally, Bonnie's testimony only minimally contains any statement which 
demonstrates defendant's state of mind. For example, Bonnie testified that it "seemed like 
[Angie] got into a jealous rage" (R.432: 99), not that defendant said she was. Bonnie's 
interpretation of what defendant told her only adds to the statement's unreliability. And to 
the degree Bonnie testified to a statement directly reflective of defendant's state of mind, that 
statement ("Okay, let's see who wins") evidences defendant's emotional callousness, not his 
emotional distress. 
In sum, while the court did not specifically address the state of mind exception, its 
findings establish that defendant's statements to Bonnie do not qualify for admission under 
rule 803(3). 
25
 Defendant claims that the trial court was precluded from assessing the 
"credibility" of his defense {BrAplt. at 19 & n.20). Defendant is correct that a trial court 
may not usurp the fact-finder's duty to determine ultimate credibility. See State v. 
Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980). But here, the court was not assessing credibility, 
it was determining admissibility—and admissibility mandates a determination of 
reliability. See Parker, 2000 UT 51, H 13; Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1228. 
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Defendant argues that even if his hearsay statements do not qualify for admission 
under an exception to the hearsay rule, nevertheless, due process compels their admission 
{Br.Aplt. at 10; R.431: 32-33). The argument is without merit. 
Normally, evidentiary rulings are not of constitutional proportion. See Branch, 91 
F.3d at 729 (recognizing that neither the constitution nor the evidentiary rules require "the 
admission of [a defendant's] entire statement once any portion is admitted into a criminal 
prosecution"); Wright, Federal Practice § 5022 n.5 (Supp. 2002) ("The completeness 
doctrine is an evidentiary doctrine, not a rule of constitutional law binding on states."). 
Moreover, while restricting a defendant from testifying violates the constitution, permitting 
a defendant to explain the circumstances of his crime comports with due process. See Rock 
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (recognizing that "the most important witness for the 
defense in many criminal cases is the defendant himself;" "[ejven more fundamental to a 
personal defense than the right of self-representation . . . is an accused's right to present his 
own version of events in his own words"). 
Here, the trial court properly restricted Bonnie from testifying to defendant's self-
serving and uncorroborated statements, the truth of which she had no personal knowledge. 
See UTAH R. EVID. 602 (prohibiting a witness from testifying unless "the witness has 
personal knowledge of the matter") {Addendum A). This is precisely the type of testimony 
intended to be excluded by the hearsay rule: 
The hearsay rule, Fed. Rule. Evid. 802, is premised on the theory that out-of-
court statements are subject to particular hazards. The declarant might be 
lying; he might have misperceived the events which he relates; he might have 
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faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or taken out of context by 
the listener. And the way in which these dangers are minimized for in-court 
statements—the oath, the witness' awareness of the gravity of the proceedings, 
the jury's ability to observe the witness5 demeanor, and most importantly, the 
right of the opponent to cross-examine—are generally absent from things said 
out of court. 
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598.26 At the same time, the trial court left unrestricted defendant's 
right to testify; consequently, his due process rights were protected. See United States v. 
Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315-316 (1998) (excluding evidence does not violate due process 
unless it significantly undermines "fundamental elements of [a] defendant's defense"; a 
defense is not undermined when a defendant is allowed to personally testify and/or introduce 
relevant factual evidence); State v. Garcia, 965 P.2d 508, 516-17 (Utah App. 1998) 
(recognizing that even when exculpatory evidence is wrongfully excluded, there is no 
constitutional violation if the defendant is able to "obtain comparable evidence by other 
reasonably available means") (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court need not determine if Utah's evidentiary rules incorporate oral 
completeness because, regardless of the scope of rule 611, no theory compels inclusion of 
defendant's non-inculpatory statements to Bonnie. Whether analyzed under rule 611 or 
under the more specific rules 801(d)(2), 803(3), and 804(b)(3), the trial court properly 
exercised its discretion in excluding defendant's self-serving, uncorroborated, and unreliable 
26
 The state and federal versions of rule 802 are substantively identical. See 
Addendum A. 
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process: defendant retained the right to testify and to otherwise introduce relevant admissible 
evidence. Consequently, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction for murder. 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 101. Scope. 
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to the extent and 
with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101 
Rule 106. Remainder nf iir related writings or recorded 
statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a 
party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it.. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
^ ^
 5 y i p r | v l l e g e s recognized. 
Except as provided in the Constitutions of the United States and the State 
of Utah, no person shall have a privilege to withhold evidence except as 
provided by these or other rules adopted by the Utah Supreme Court or by 
existing statutory provisions not in conflict with them. 
(Amended effective April 15, 1992.) 
Euie 602. Lack of personal knowledge. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient 
to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. 
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the 
witness' own testimony. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, 
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992 I 
H I I | e £LJL m 0 € | e a o u u r ( i e „ i interrogation and presents* 
tion. 
(a) Control by court The court shall exercise reasonable control over the 
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) 
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the 
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment 
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examination should be limited to the 
subject matter of the direct examination and matters aiSecting the credibility 
of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into 
additional matters as if on direct examination. 
<c> Leading questions. Leading questions should not be used on the direct 
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' 
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-exami-
nation. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness 
identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant0 is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which am mt hearmy. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the state-
ment is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party 
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representa-
tive capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption 
or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to 
make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's 
agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement 
by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October ". I""" 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay ^dmissiblF except as provided by law or by these rules. 
Kule 80S. Hearsay exceptions; avai la h ility • c:i I • decla lira nt 
immaterial. 
The following are not excluded bj the hearsay rule, even though th = 
declarant is available as a witness; 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event 
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition 
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition A statement of 
the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical 
condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact 
remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identi-
fication, or terms of declarant's will. 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements 
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical 
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or 
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general character of the cause or exte s 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter 
about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollec-
tion to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been 
made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' 
memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum 
or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit 
unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, 
or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a 
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that 
complies with Rule 902(11), Rules 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, 
unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph 
includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling 
of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda, 
reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the 
provisions of Paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the 
matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or 
data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compi-
lations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities 
of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law 
as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal 
cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, 
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal 
cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of 
births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a 
public office pursuant to requirements of law. 
(10) Absence of public record or entry, lb prove the absence of a record, 
report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or 
nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data 
compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office 
or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with Rule 902, 
or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, state-
ment, or data compilation, or entry. 
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, 
divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, or 
other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept 
record of a religious organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact con-
tained in a certificate that the maker performed a marriage or other ceremony 
or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or other 
person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law 
to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of 
the act or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
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(1 3) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family 
history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, 
inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or 
the like. 
(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a 
document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of 
the content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by 
each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record 
of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of 
documents of that kind in that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement 
contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in 
property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, 
unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been 
inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document. 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in exist-
ence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established. 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabula-
tions, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and 
relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations. 
(18) Learned treatises, lb the extent called to the attention of an expert 
witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct 
examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or 
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established 
as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other 
expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read 
into evidence but may not be received as exhibits. 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among 
members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a 
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, 
marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history. 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a 
community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs 
affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general 
history important to the community or State or nation in which located 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among 
associates or in the community. 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered 
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), 
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not 
including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for 
purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the 
accused. The pendency of an, appeal may be shown but does not affect 
admissibility 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. 
Judgments as proof of matters of personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by 
evidence of reputation. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effecth i ?> ( > < t < >] < • E 1! 1992; N< > veil Hi >er ] , 200] ) 
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Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situ-
ations in which the declarant 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearinfr 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's state 
ment has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or othei 
reasonable means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim 
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdo-
ing of the proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing 
the witness from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsa} i i lie 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of 
the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with 
law in the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom 
the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor 
in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by 
direct, cross, or redirect examination. 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or criminal action 
or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that the 
declarant's death was imminent, if the judge finds it was made in good faith. 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its 
making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or 
so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render 
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in 
the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it 
to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circum-
stances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. (A) A statement concerning the 
declarant's own birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, relationship by 
blood, adoption or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history, even though the declarant had no means of acquiring personal 
knowledge of the matter stated; or (B) a statement concerning the foregoing 
matters, and death also, of another person, if the declarant was related to the 
other by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the 
other's family as to be likely to have accurate information concerning the 
matter declared. 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure 
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception 
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in 
advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
(Amended effective Octobei 1 , 1992.) 
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R u l e 106. Remainder of or Related Writings 
or Recorded Statements 
When a writing or recorded statement or part 
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party 
may require the introduction at that time of any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement which 
ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously 
with i t 
(Pub.L. 93-596, § 1, Jan. 2,1975,88 Stat 1930; Mar. 2,1987, 
eff. Oct 1,1967.) 
Rll l6 611. Mode and Order of Interrogation 
and Presentation 
(a) Control by court The court shall exercise 
reasonable control over the mode and order of interro-
gating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) 
make the interrogation and presentation effective for 
the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless 
consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment 
(b) Scope of cross-examination. Cross-examina-
tion should be limited to the subject matter of the 
direct examination and matters affecting the credibili-
ty of the witness. The court may, in the exercise of 
discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if 
on direct examination. 
(c) Leading questions. Leading questions should 
not be used on the direct examination of a witness 
except as may be necessary to develop the witness' 
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be 
permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a 
hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identi-
fied with an adverse party, interrogation may be by 
leading questions. 
(Pub.L. 93-596, § 1, Jan. 2,1975, 88 Stat 1936; Mar. 2,1987, 
eff. Oct 1,1987.) 
R u l e 801. Definitions 
The Mowing definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, 
if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who 
makes a statement 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A state-
ment is not hearsay if— 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and 
the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declar-
ant's testimony, and was given under oath subject 
to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding, or in a deposition, or (B) consistent with 
the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an 
express or implied charge against the declarant of 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, 
or (C) one of identification of a person made after 
perceiving the person; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent The state-
ment is offered against a party and is (A) the 
party's own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity or (B) a statement of which 
the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorised by 
the party to make a statement concerning the sub-
ject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the 
agency or employment, made during the existence 
of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a cocon-
spirator of a party during the course and in further-
ance of the conspiracy. The contents of the state-
ment shall be considered but are not alone sufficient 
to establish the declarant's authority under subdivi-
sion (C), the agency or employment relationship and 
scope thereof under subdivision (D), or the exis-
tence of the conspiracy and the participation therein 
of the declarant and the party against whom the 
statement is offered under subdivision (E). 
(Pub.L. 93-596, § l, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Statl938; Pub.L. 
94-113, § 1, Oct 16,1975,89 Stat. 576; Mar. 2,1987, eff. Oct 
1,1987; Apr. 11,1997, eff. Dec. 1,1997.) 
R u l e 802. Hearsay Rule 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by 
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Su-
preme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by 
Act of Congress. 
(Pub.L. 93-595, § 1, Jan. 2,1975,88 Stat 1939.) 
R u l e 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of 
Declarant Immaterial 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a witness 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement de-
scribing or explaining an event or condition made 
while the declarant was perceiving the event or 
condition, or immediately thereafter 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to 
a startling event or condition made while the declar-
ant was under the stress of excitement caused by 
the event or condition 
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physi-
cal condition. A statement of the declarant's then 
existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physi-
cal condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, 
mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not 
including a statement of memory or belief to prove 
the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to 
the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of 
declarant's will 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagno-
sis or treatment Statements made for purposes of 
medical diagnosis or treatment and describing med-
ical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or 
sensations, or the inception or general character of 
the cause or external source thereof insofar as 
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment 
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or 
record concerning a matter about which a witness 
once had knowledge but now has insufficient recol-
lection to enable the witness to testify fully and 
accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by 
the witness when the matter was fresh in the wit-
ness' memory and to reflect that knowledge correct-
ly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be 
read into evidence but may not itself be received as 
an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party. 
(6) Records of Regularly Conducted Activi-
ty .—A memorandum, report, record, or data compi-
lation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opin-
ions, or diagnoses, made at or near the tune by, or 
from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity, and if it was the regu-
lar practice of that business activity to make the 
memorandum, report, record or data compilation, 
all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
other qualified witness, or by certification that com-
plies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute 
permitting certification, unless the source of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of prepara-
tion indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term 
"business" as used in this paragraph includes busi-
ness, institution, association, profession, occupation, 
and calling of every kind whether or not conducted 
for profit 
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accor-
dance with the provisions of paragraph (6). Evi-
dence that a matter is not included in the memoran-
da reports, records, or data compilations, in any 
form, kept in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonex-
istence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of 
which a memorandum, report, record, or data com-
pilation was regularly made and preserved, unless 
the sources of information or other circumstances 
indicate lack of trustworthiness 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, re-
ports, statements, or data compilations, m any form, 
of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the 
activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters 
observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to 
which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, 
however, in criminal cases matters observed by 
police officers and other law enforcement personnel, 
or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against 
the Government in criminal cases, factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to 
authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness 
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data 
compdataons, m any form, of births, fetal deaths, 
deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made 
to a public office pursuant to requirements of law 
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To 
prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or 
data compilation, m any form, or the nonoccurrence 
or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, 
report, statement or data compilation, in any form, 
was regularly made and preserved by a public office 
or agency, evidence m the form of a certification in 
accordance with rule 902, or testimony, that diligent 
search failed to disclose the record, report, state-
ment or data compilation, or entry 
(11) Records of religious organizations. State-
ments of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legiti-
macy, ancestry, relationship by blood or marriage, 
or other similar facts of personal or family history, 
contained m a regularly kept record of a religious 
organization. 
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certifi-
cates. Statements of fact contained in a certificate 
that the maker performed a marriage or other 
ceremony or administered a sacrament made by a 
clergyman, public official, or other person autho-
rized by the rules or practices of a religious organi-
zation or by law to perform the act certified, and 
purporting to have been issued at the time of the 
act or within a reasonable tame thereafter 
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(13) Family records. Statements of fact con-
cerning personal or family history contained in fam-
ily Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, 
inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, 
crypts, or tombstones, or the like 
(14) Records of documents affecting an inter-
est in property. The record of a document pur-
porting to establish or affect an interest in property, 
as proof of the content of the original recorded 
document and its execution and delivery by each 
person by whom it purports to have been executed, 
if the record is a record of a public office and an 
applicable statute authorizes the recording of docu-
ments of that kind m that office. 
(15) Statements in documents affecting an in-
terest in property. A statement contained m a 
document purporting to establish or affect an inter-
est in property if the matter stated was relevant to 
the purpose of the document, unless dealings with 
the property smce the document was made have 
been inconsistent with the truth of the statement or 
the purport of the document 
(16) Statements in ancient documents. State-
ments in a document in existence twenty years or 
more the authenticity of which is established 
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. 
Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or 
other published compilations, generally used and 
relied upon by the public or by persons in particular 
occupations 
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to 
the attention of an expert witness upon cross-exami-
nation or relied upon by the expert witness in direct 
examination, statements contained in published 
treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of 
history, medicine, or other science or art, estab-
lished as a reliable authority by the testimony or 
admission of the witness or by other expert testimo-
ny or by judicial notice If admitted, the state-
ments may be read into evidence but may not be 
received as exhibits 
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family 
history. Reputation among members of a person's 
family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a 
person's associates, or in the community, concerning 
a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, 
legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or mar-
riage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or 
family history 
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or gen-
eral history. Reputation in a community, arising 
before the controversy, as to boundaries of or cus-
toms affecting lands in the community, and reputa-
tion as to events of general history important to the 
community or State or nation in which located 
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of 
a person's character among associates or in the 
community 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evi-
dence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or 
upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo 
contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the 
judgment, but not including, when offered by the 
Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes 
other than impeachment, judgments against persons 
other than the accused The pendency of an appeal 
may be shown but does not affect admissibility 
(23) Judgment as to personal, family, or gener-
al history, or boundaries. Judgments as proof of 
matters of personal, family or general history, or 
boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same 
would be provable by evidence of reputation 
(24) [Transferred to Rule 807] 
(Pub.L 93-595, § 1, Jan 2, 1975, 88 Stat 1939, Pub L 
94-149, § 1(11), Dec 12,1975, 89 Stat 805, Mar 2,1987 eft 
Oct 1, 1987, Apr 11, 1997, eff Dec 1, 1997, Apr 17, 2000, 
eff Dec 1,2000) 
Rule 804 RULES OF EVIDENCE 
R u l e 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Un-
available 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability 
as a witness" includes situations in which the declar-
ant— 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the 
ground of privilege from testifying concerning the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement, or 
(2) persists m refusing to testify concerning the 
subject matter of the declarant's statement despite 
an order of the court to do so, or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject 
matter of the declarant's statement, or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the 
hearing because of death or then existing physical 
or mental illness or infirmity, or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent 
of a statement has been unable to procure the 
declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hearsay 
exception under subdivision (bX2), (3), or (4), the 
declarant's attendance or testimony) by process or 
other reasonable means 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemp-
tion, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or 
absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of 
the proponent of a statement for the purpose of 
preventing the witness from attending or testifying 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is un-
available as a witness 
(1) Former testimony. Testimony given as a 
witness at another hearing of the same or a differ-
ent proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compli-
ance with law m the course of the same or another 
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony 
is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a 
predecessor m interest, had an opportunity and 
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, 
cross, or redirect examination 
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. 
In a prosecution for homicide or in a cavil action or 
proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while 
believing that the declarant's death was imminent, 
concerning the cause or circumstances of what the 
declarant believed to be impending death 
(3) Statement against interest. A statement 
which was at the time of its making so far contrary 
to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, 
or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or 
criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the 
declarant against another, that a reasonable person 
in the declarant's position would not have made the 
statement unless believing it to be true A state-
ment tending to expose the declarant to criminal 
liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstances 
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the state-
ment 
(4) Statement of personal or family history. 
(A) A statement concerning the declarant's own 
birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, legitimacy, rela-
tionship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, 
or other similar fact of personal or family history, 
even though declarant had no means of acquiring 
personal knowledge of the matter stated, or (B) a 
statement concerning the foregoing matters, and 
death also, of another person, if the declarant was 
related to the other by blood, adoption, or marriage 
or was so intimately associated with the other's 
family as to be likely to have accurate information 
concerning the matter declared 
(5) [Transferred to Rule 807] 
(6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement of-
fered against a party that has engaged or ac-
quiesced m wrongdomg that was intended to, and 
did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a 
witness 
(PubL 93-595, § 1, Jan 2, 1975, 88 Stat 1942, PubL 
94-149, § 1(12), (13), Dec 12, 1975, 89 Stat 806, Mar 2, 
1987, eff Oct 1,1987, PubL 100-^90, Title VII, § 7075(b), 
Nov 18, 1988, 102 Stat 4405, Apr 11, 1997, eff Dec 1, 
1997) 
Addendum B 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q And did you overhear him say anything to his son? 
3 A No, he only was holding — the boy was holding him 
4 and everything else and I guess — he's heavy, so until he put 
5 him down, or I don't know what happened, but he jumped on him. 
6 Q But you don't remember hearing anything? 
7 A No, I don't remember him talking, no. 
8 MS. BUCHI: If I can have just a minute, Your Honor. 
9 That's all. Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Anything else? 
11 MS. WISSLER: No, Your Honor, no redirect. 
12 (A brief recess was taken.) 
13 THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed? 
14 State of Utah versus Jose Cruz-Meza. 
15 Do you want to call your next witness? 
16 MR. D'ALESANDRO: The State calls Bonnie Santa-Cruz. 
17 THE COURT: Let the record show that Mr. Cruz-Meza is 
18 present in the courtroom. 
19 THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear the testimony you 
20 shall give in this case will be the truth, the whole truth and 
21 nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
22 THE WITNESS: I do. 
23 MR. HEINEMAN: Judge, the defense would move to have 
24 Ms. Santa-Cruz advised of the spousal priviledge in Article 1, 
25 Section 12(a), I believe they are common law husband and wife. 
1 They have also expressed to me their intent to formally get 
2 married and — 
3 THE COURT: To get married at this time? 
4 MR. HEINEMAN: Well, they have had a no contact order 
5 in place as a result of this case, but they have desired to 
6 marry each other for some time now. And we would ask that that 
7 order be lifted and that the Court marry them. 
8 THE COURT: Well, Ifm not going to do that right now. 
9 I don't know if I'm following what you're saying to me. They 
10 can get married at some point in the future, I don't have a 
11 problem with that. At this point in time, no. 
12 MR. HEINEMAN: And, Judge, we would argue that they 
13 are common law husband and wife. They have a child together, 
14 they've lived together for years, they are in love with each 
15 other, they're holding themselves out — 
16 THE COURT: Well, you're making that representation, 
17 but I don't see any proof of that. That very well may be the 
18 case. I don't know that she necessarily has the privilege, if 
19 that's what you're referring to, to not testify if she chooses. 
20 At this point in time, I'm not ready to address that issue. 
21 MR. HEINEMAN: Well, it is the — 
22 THE COURT: I mean it's a legal finding to establish 
23 a common law marriage. And you're right, you have to hold 
24 yourself out as a married couple, you have to represent to the 
25 world that you're a married couple and there are a variety of 
1 factors that have to be considered. 
2 He was dating, apparently, from what I'm to gather, 
3 the decedent in this case, so I don't know that they were 
4 together at any point in time has any relevance. So I think as 
5 far as things go, we're going to proceed* 
6 MR. HEINEMAN: I think it would be appropriate at 
7 this time to ask this witness those questions and — 
8 THE COURT: No, I'm not going to. I mean the facts 
9 that I have before me right now establish that he had this 
10 Zabriskie woman as his girlfriend and Ms. Vallejo told me that. 
11 Now maybe there is some other evidence that's going to come in 
12 to establish that further, but that doesn't tell me that they 
13 were in a common law marriage relationship. 
14 MR. HEINEMAN: And, Judge, I would say the evidence 
15 was that he had been with her for five, six, seven years, is 
16 what her mother testified to, that this relationship was — 
17 THE COURT: But they weren't — 
18 MR. HEINEMAN: — had been very short-term. 
19 THE COURT: Well, I don't — as far as I'm concerned, 
20 in terms of what we're dealing with here today, I don't find 
21 that compelling, I truly don't. Okay? 
22 Mr. D'Alesandro, do you want to proceed? 
23 MR. D'ALESANDRO: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 BONNIE SANTA-CRUZ, 
25 having been duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXMCCNATICW 
BY MR. D'AIESANDRO: 
Q Please state and spell your full legal name. 
A My full legal name is Araceli Drayna Santa-Cruz. 
Q Would you spell that, please. 
A Araceli, A-R-A-C-E-L-I, Drayna, D-R-A-Y-N-A, 
Santa-Cruz, S-A-N-T-A C-R-U-Z. 
Q Thank you. Do you have any nicknames? 
A Bonnie. 
Q Is there another nickname you also go by? 
A Ana. 
Q Ana, is that — 
THE COURT: Keep your voice up. This woman down here 
is taking everything down that you say and it's very important 
that you articulate your words and keep your voice up so that 
everybody can hear. In fact you want the defense attorneys to 
be able to hear what you have to say too. 
Q (BY MR. DfALESANDRO) How do you spell Ana? 
A A-N-A. 
Q Thank you. Do you share your first name with someone 
else? 
A I don't understand the question. 
Q Does someone else in your family have the same first 
name? 



































Yes, my mother. 
And she was the individual that just testified? 
Correct. 
Do you know a person by the name of Jose Meza-Cruz? 
I do. 




















Would you point him out, please. 
Right there. 
MR. D'ALESANDRO: May the record 
identification of the defendant, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: It may. 
(BY MR. D'ALESANDRO) How do you know Mr. Meza-Cruz? 
He's the father of my child, my five-year-old child. 
together previous for about six years. 1 
When did you first meet him? 
I met him in 1994, May of 1994. 
And did you live together for a while? 
Yes, sir. 
Until when? 
February of 1999. 
I'm sorry? 

















































THE COURT: Wait a minute, let's establish — they 
in May of '94. 
When did you begin living together? 
THE WITNESS: Since that time. 
THE COURT: Since that time? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. j 
(BY MR. D'ALESANDRO) You lived together until 
of 1999? 
Yes, sir. 
During that time, were you ever legally married? 
No, sir. 
But you did have a child together? 
Yes, sir. J 
Was his name Joseph? 
Joseph Adam Meza. 
Now, at some point you stopped seeing Mr. Crus-Meza? 
Yes, sir. 
Did one of you move out? 
Yes, sir. 
Which one of you? 
He did. 
































No, that occurred in April of 1999. 
April 1999? 
Yes, sir. 
Now, you indicated that you lived together until 
1999. 
I said February because at that time my brother 
passed away and I was dealing with his death and I actually 







ies at that time because of what I was going through. 
I felt --
And he moved out? 
In April. 
Now, did he begin seeing someone else? 
I didn't know at that time if he was seeing anybody 










hip until perhaps maybe in — I'm trying to think. It 
Christmas. In January 2000 is when I found out for 
there was a relationship. I didn't know who he might 
with. 
Did you later learn that person's name? 
Yes, sir. 
Was it Angie Zabriskie? 
Yes, sir. 
Now, ma'am, do you speak Spanish? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Does Mr. Meza-Cruz speak Spanish? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q When you communicated with each other, was it in 
Spanish, English or both? 
A Actually, it was in Spanish. 
Q And do you know him by any other names or nicknames 
other than Jose? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q What are those? 
A Chato. 
Q Did you also refer to him as Chopper? 
A No. 
Q Did you ever hear anyone refer to him as Chopper? 
A No, sir. 
Q No? Now, Ms. Zabriskie, did you ever meet her? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Now, after Mr. Cruz-Meza moved out, did you 
communicate with him from time to time? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q And you had a child together and that was part of the 
reason; correct? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Now, on May 20th of the year 2000, were you working? 
A Yes, sir. 
75 
1 Q Where were you working? 
2 A Home Depot. 
3 Q What was the address of Home Depot? 
4 A All I know, itfs on 90th South and Redwood Road, I 
5 don't know the exact address. 
6 Q Thank you. And what was your job there? 
7 A Cashier. 
8 Q Now, on that date in the morning hours, did anyone 
9 come to visit you at work? 
10 A Yes, sir. 
11 Q Who was that? 
12 A Chato. 
13 Q Mr. Crus-Meza? 
14 A Yes, sir. 
15 Q Were you working as a cashier at that time? 
16 A Yes, sir. 
17 Q Did he come into the store? 
18 A Yes, sir. 
19 Q Do you recall what time it was? 
20 A It was a little after I had to get in to work. I had 
21 to report to work at 9:00, so I'd say about 9:30, around there. 
22 Q Are you regularly scheduled for breaks when you work 
23 at Home Depot? 
24 A Yes, sir. 








































Oh, it would have been like four hours after putting 
to work. 
So you started at what time? 
I started at 9:00. 
So your next break would have been, then, at 1:00? 
Around there. 
Do you recall how close to the break the defendant 
? 1 
THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. She's already told 
came in about 9:30 a.m, three and a half hours away from 
break. The break was 1:00. J 
the 
MR. D'ALESANDRO: Well, I'm testing her recollection 
incident, Your Honor, because it would be my contention 










THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
(BY MR. D'ALESANDRO) How close to the break was it? 
It wasn't very close, it was still early. I had just 
my shift. 
Had you been getting phone calls at work? 
Yes, sir. J 
Did those come before or after Mr. Cruz-Meza came in? 
After. 





































Did you have messages — 
Yes, sir. 
— as well? 
Yes, sir. 
Did those come before or after Mr. Cruz-Meza came in? 
After. 
When he came in, did he come in with anyone? 
No, I didn't see anyone with him. 
What did he say when you first saw him? 
He said, I need to see you, if you could take some 















Did you ask him to wait? 
Actually, I didn't ask him to wait. I said, I can't, 
started my shift and I don't have break until in four 
What was his response to that? 
He didn't respond at that time, but I got the feeling 
wanted to talk to me urgently. But he didn't tell me 
time out to go see him. 
Did you notice anything about his appearance when he 
? 
Yes. 
What was that? 
































or if he 
A 
I could ; 














Did you ask him about that? 
Yes, sir. 
What did he say? 
He said, No, actually, I'm not drunk. 
Did he ever indicate to you what he'd been drinking 
'd been drinking at all? 
No, sir. And, actually, I got close enough to see if 
smell anything and I didn't smell any alcohol, as far 
remember. 
Were you having this conversation in English or 
With — I'm sorry. 
With Mr. Cruz-Meza, this conversation, was is it in 
Dr Spanish? 
It's in Spanish. 
Spanish? 
Yes, sir. 1 
You indicated that you felt as if he wanted to talk 
urgently. 
Yes, sir. 
Did you make arrangements to talk with him? 
Yes, sir. I spoke to my supervisor who was looking 
at me and asked me if there was a problem, and I said, I'd like 
to know . 
my shift 











































And he said, Is everything all right? 
And I said, I don't know yet, I don't know if there's 
ncy or something coming up. 
And he said, Take the 15. So he let me leave my 
And then you had a conversation — 
Yes, sir. 
— with Mr. Cruz-Meza? 
Yes, sir. 
Did that conversation take place in the store or 
0 
No, sir, it was in the parking lot of the store. J 
Where in the parking lot? 
In the front of Home Depot, parking lot area. 
Was it outside? 
Oh, yes, sir, it was outside. 
Did you ask him how he'd gotten there? 
Yes, sir. 
What did he tell you? 
He didn't tell me anything yet. We were walking 
towards the car and then that's when I saw the car and that's 
how I rea 
or how he 
Q 
A 
lized how he got there. I didn't know what he came in 
got there, he didn't answer me. 

































Whose car was it? 
It was her car. 
"Her," who are you referring to? 
Ms. Zabriskie. 
Had you seen her car before? 
No, sir. 


















THE COURT: You may. 
(BY MR. D'ALESANDRO) Let me hand you what's been 
State's Exhibit No. 5. Have you ever seen the car 
in that photograph? 
Yes, sir. 
Would you compare that car to the one that we just 
that was in the parking lot of Home Depot? 
Yes, sir. 
How does it compare? 
It's the same car. I 
So you went out to the car. Did you go inside it? 
Yes, sir. 
Did Mr. Cruz-Meza get inside as well? 1 
Yes, sir. 
Which seat did you sit m ? 
On the passenger's side. 
















































Did you continue the conversation that you had 
in the store with him? 
Yes, sir. 
Did you ask Mr. Cruz-Meza why he was driving that 
Yes, sir. 
What did he say? 
He didn't answer me at first. 
Did he eventually say? 
As we got into the conversation, that's how I found 
he came about with the car. 
And what reason was that? 
He said he borrowed her car. That's what he said at 
Borrowed it or took it? 
He said he borrowed her car. 
Did you ask him where he'd been? 
Yes, sir. 
What did he say? 
He said he came from home, from where he was living 




the farm first to see Joseph. That's what he said, he 
after coming to see Joseph. 





























A Oh, that's where my mother lives. She was watching 


















In Pleasant Grove? 
Yes, sir. 
Did he say why he had gone to the farm? 
He said he wanted to see Joseph. 
His son? 
Yes, sir. 
Did he say anything about Ms. Zabriskie? 1 
No, sir, not at that time. 
Okay. After he said he went to see Joseph, did you 
to talk? 
Yes, sir. 
Did you ask him about Ms. Zabriskie? J 
Yes, sir, I did. 
What did he say about her? 
That's when he started telling me why he wanted to go 
Joseph. First he said he loved Joseph very much, that he 






had killed her. 
He had killed her? 
Yes, sir. 
Who was he referring to? J 



































Okay, what was his answer? 
"Her," he was referring to "her." 
Did you believe him at first? 
No, sir, I didn't. 
Why not? 
I thought maybe it might have been a domestic 
I said they had to have gotten into an argument. And 
I didn't think he did anything like that, honestly, I didn't 
believe 
You got 
it. And I tried to ask him more questions and I said, 
into a fight with her, right? It was an argument, it 






was, because actually I didn't believe he was doing — 
did that. 
What did he say? 
He kept insisting, he said, Yes, I did. And I was 
at his appearance to see if there was anything on him 
that would make me believe that he did or cuts or anything. I 








That's what I thought, I was — you know, if he had 

































see anything at that point. 
Did he show you anything at that point? 
Yes, sir. 1 
What was it he showed you? 
He took out a knife from his pocket and he said, This 
I used to kill her. And I said, No, you didn't. I 
denying it, I don't think you did. And then he opened it 
up and 
cut 
there was some blood stains on it. And I thought, he 
himself, he probably cut himself on his arm or something. 




that there might have been a cut from that that's where 














But you didn't see anything? 
No, sir, I — like I said, I was looking. 1 
Now, the knife that he took out, did you see where he 
out from? 
From his pocket, his pants pocket. 1 
Pants pocket? 
Yes, sir. 1 
Front or back? 1 
It was the front, I think. 
Now, was the knife a folding knife? 
It looked like that when I saw it. 
Did the blade fold out? 




























Can you describe the blade itself? 














How long was the blade, if you can estimate? 
Well, do you want me to make a guess or what I 
Was it, say, longer than a pencil? 
No, it wasn't longer than a pencil. 
THE COURT: Are we talking'about the blade or the 
(BY MR. D'ALESANDRO) The blade. 
No, it wasn't longer than a pencil. 
How about the knife itself, do you remember anything 
handle? 
No, sir, I don't, honestly. 
Do you remember whether perhaps the handle was metal 
or some other material? 
A 
see anyth 
The only thing I saw metal was the blade. I didn't 
ing as far as the handle, I don't know that he had 




Did the blade appear to be a one-edge blade or 
olade? 
I don't understand that question because I don't know 
what a two-edge blade would look like. 


































It looked like a one-edge blade. 
One edge? Do you remember telling the police that 
was perhaps five or six inches long? 
I guess, I don't remember. 
Would that be accurate? 
I'm not — 
THE COURT: She says she doesn't remember. 
THE WITNESS: I don't remember. 
(BY MR. D'ALESANDRO) When he showed you the knife, 
did he say anything to you? 
A He said — I don't remember. He moaned and said, 










I'm assuming at that point he put the knife away? 
Yes, sir, because I didn't see it anymore after that. 
Did you have an opportunity to look around the car 
were seated in the car? 
I was looking around the car, yes, sir. 
What did you see, if anything? 
I saw like perhaps construction equipment in the back 
was maybe looking for something like clothing of his 




Did the construction equipment have any significance 
1 to you? 
2 A No, I understood that she was in construction, her 
3 occupation consisted of construction, and I assumed that that 
4 was hers. 
5 Q Did you see anything that indicated to you that 
6 Mr. Cruz-Meza may have been drinking? 
7 A No, sir, I didn't see anything like that, that's why 
8 I kept asking him if he was drunk. He did — now that I 
9 remember, I think he had a bottle of beer in his hand, 
10 Q Was there a particular kind of beer that he drank 
11 most often? 
12 A I didn't notice that, sir. I didn't notice what type 
13 of beer or what it was or — just a dark bottle. 
14 Q Well, I'm saying from your experience of having lived 
15 with him for five years. 
16 A I really never allowed it in my home. To be honest 
17 with you, I don't know what he drank, I never wanted to take 
18 notice of that. I didn't allow drinking or smoking in my home. 
19 Q At any time, did the defendant show you a gun? 
20 A Any time, what do you mean by that question? Any 
21 time when we were together? 
22 Q When you were out in the car. 
23 A No, sir. 
24 Q Did you see a gun in the car? 
25 A No, sir. 
Ms, 
see 
Q Did Mr. Cruz-Meza ever indicate why he killed 
Zabriskie? 
A He indicated and said that she would not let him go 
















said that he had better not leave to go see his son. 
Did he say what happened? 
He said — yes. He told me that he told her that he 
> go see his son and they got into an argument over it. 
Did he talk about taking out the knife — 
Yes. 
— during the argument? 
Oh, during the argument? 1 
Yes. 
Yes, sir, he indicated that she had a gun in her hand 
he took out the knife as a protection. 
Did he say what happened then? J 
He said that he was — he told her, I'm going to go 








he was going to go see his son. 
She said, If you walk out of this door, I'll shoot 
this gun, put a bullet through your head. 
He said, I'm warning you, I want to go see my son and 
see my son. 
And all I can remember is that he said he took out 





I asked h 
that that 
s all I remember that he said. 
Did he say what he was going to do 
I asked him that. I 
im. And he was going 
would be better. He 




There wasn't — he 
, that's what he said. 
next? 
said, What are you goi 
to turn himse. 
said he didn'1 
ng to do? 
Lf into the police, 
t know at 
was very confused, in 
indicated to me, Maybe 










a state of 
I'll go 
some money for 
Did you give him some money for cigarettes? 
I gave him my lunch money that I had in my 
probably like $5, $6, 
What happened then? 
I stated to him that 
around there, 





time, I better get back to work, it's more than 15 minutes. 
And then 1 le says — and then I thought about 
you need me to talk to you some more? I can 






Did you then go back 
Yes, sir, I did. 
What did he do? 
He drove off. 
Do you remember what 
to work? 
time you went 
it and I said, Do 




1 A No, sir, I don't. I know that — I don't remember or 
2 recollect the time, no. 
3 Q Do you remember telling the police that it might have 
4 been ten of 12:00? 
5 A No, sir, I don't: remember. 
6 Q How long were you out in the car? 
7 A Like I said, I thought it was more than 15 minutes. 
8 That's usually when I go to break. I don't know exactly how 
9 much time I was out there. 
10 MR. D'ALESANDRO: Thank you. Excuse me one moment. 
11 Thank you. That's all I have. 
12 CROSS EKttflNftTICN 
13 BY MR, HEINEMttl: 
14 Q When did you first meet Angie Zabriskie? 
15 A I met her — he worked — Chato worked with her 
16 brother, gosh, I don't remember, maybe it might have been three 
17 years previous to that. For the fact that her brother and him 
18 worked together, he would come often to our house and visit 
19 with us and Chato would bring him home. 
20 Actually, I don't remember — I met her through her 
21 brother when we went to go pick him up one time from work, he 
22 said this is his sister, or when we dropped him off from work. 
23 I can't remember how we met. All I know is that I used to go 
24 pick him up from work, her brother used to be along with him 
25 and bring him to work. And it might have been at one of those 
1 times and he said, I live here with my sister. 
2 Q And you think that was sometime in mid-1997? 
3 A Yeah. Yes, sir. 
4 Q How often would you see her? 
5 A I didn't see her very often, I only saw her like 
6 maybe that one time. It wasn't — I guess when we used to take 
7 her brother home, but I hardly ever — how often throughout the 
8 year or how often — 
9 Q Over that three-year period, how often do you think? 
10 A Maybe I seen her like four times. 
11 Q Would it just be on a quick occasion like that or — 
12 A Yes, sir. 
13 Q Okay. Did Chato talk about her at all? 
14 A He would talk about him living there with her, 
15 nothing — what do you mean by that question, Alonzo — 
16 Q Just what would he say about her and their 
17 relationship? 
18 A I didn't realize there was a relationship, I didn't 
19 think there was any kind of a relationship going on. He would 
20 just say sometimes his sister was getting more money from 
21 Alonzo for rent than she needed to. There were just little 
22 conversations like that, but it wasn't anything as far as 
23 talking about her, no. 
24 Q At some point you found out that there was a 
25 relationship; is that right9 
1 A Yes, sir. 
2 Q Did he talk about her at all after that? 
3 A After that? Yes, sir. 
4 I Q And what would he say about that? 
5 I A That the relationship was not good, that he wished — 
6 he regretted going with her. I used to ask him if he loved 
7 her, he never answered me straight, things like that. I would 
8 ask him if he was ever going to come back to be with me and 
9 Joseph and he never told me or — no, I never got a straight 
10 answer if we were ever going to get back together again. I 
11 don't know if that's what you want from me. 
12 Q Did he talk about fighting at all? 
13 A Yes, sir. He would talk to me about a lot of fights 
14 that they would have. 
15 Q How frequently? 
16 A Pretty frequent,. Every time he talked to me, he 
17 says, Oh, we're fighting again, or, Oh, this is happening. But 
18 he never really told me what they were fighting about, it was 
19 just a fight, that they were in a — fighting again. 
20 Q Did you get the sense that these were word fights or 
21 were they physical fights? 
22 A I didn't know at that time what kind of fights they 
23 were. I started asking questions with his sisters to see what 
24 they saw because I never saw anything as far as fights that 
25 they'd been in in front of us or — and I gathered from 
1 information from his sisters' conversations that there were 
2 physical fights, that's how I — but I never saw anything. 
3 Q And how frequently would these fights occur? 
4 A I don't know. I could tell you when he would call me 
5 he would tell me there was an argument or fight, but what do 
6 you mean how frequently? 
7 Q Well, would he call and talk to you about that once a 
8 month or once a week or — 
9 A He would call at least once a week — at least three 
10 times out of the week he'd call me to find out how Joseph was 
11 doing, almost every day to see if Joseph was fine, how 
12 everything was going with his son, how I was doing. But he 
13 wouldn't tell me every time that he called that there was an 
14 argument, and it — unless he brought it up in conversation. 
15 But I never asked him if they were fighting or anything like 
16 that. That's how I would know if it — 
17 Q So it wouldn't be every phone call? 
18 A No, sir. 
19 Q Would it be every second phone call, every third 
20 call? 
21 A If I had to guess, within the month I'd say maybe 
22 three times, four times out of a month. 
23 Q Okay. Did he ever talk about drugs? 
24 A Yes, sir. 
25 Q What did he say about that? 
1 A He said that he would have to look for — that her — 
2 you mean during the relationship when they were together? 
3 Q Yeah. 
4 A Yes, sir. He was saying that he would always have to 
5 look for — that she liked to shoot up. And I didn't know what 
6 he meant, and I said, Well, shoot up what? You know. And he 
7 said that he would have to look for drugs for her, that she 
8 needed it. And I would ask him, Are you doing it with her? 
9 And he would indicate, yes, he was. 
10 Q What kind of drugs? 
11 A I don't know what kind of drugs it was. All I know 
12 is that — like I said, I never allowed drugs, alcohol or 
13 smoking in my house. I didn't know what kind of drugs. I 
14 assumed it was Cocaine and Heroin, that's what I said. And he 
15 said she would frequently shoot up and he would catch her in 
16 the bathroom and he would tell her to stop using it, that it 
17 was very harmful. 
18 He mentioned one time that he did help her get off of 
19 the drug and that he didn't want her to be using that drug 
20 anymore, is what he told me, but that was in our conversations 
21 that we used to have. That's all I can remember right now. 
22 Q Did he talk about drinking at all? 
23 A Yes, sir. He said they would drink every weekend. 
24 Q How much? 
25 A I don't know how much. I know that from one 
1 experience, when he goes out, it's an all-night thing. And I 
2 assume maybe they might have done an all-night thing drinking, 
3 because from what I understood, she liked to drink alcohol. 
4 Q Did he talk about weapons at all? 
5 A He indicated that she was looking for a gun, that he 
6 wanted — that she wanted Chato to look for a weapon for her 
7 because she had a lot of enemies. And that was it, that's all 
8 I can remember, I mean as far as that. But she needed a 
9 weapon, she said — and I kept saying, Why would she want a 
10 gun, that's dangerous? And he said, She wants one. 
11 Q Do you know who these enemies were? 
12 A His enemies? 
13 Q No, the ones she was afraid of. 
14 I A I have no clue, no. 
15 Q Can you describe Chato's relationship with his son 
16 Joseph? 
17 A Yes, sir. It's a very loving relationship. When he 
18 comes to Joseph, he puts Joseph first of everything. I could 
19 say that my son's more closer to his father than he is to me. 
20 Q Was he protective of Joseph? 
21 A Yes, sir, very much protective of Joseph. He 
22 involves Joseph very much, is always very supportive of him, 
23 even when he wasn't with me. He always supported me with money 
24 for clothing, always made sure he bought him — took him out to 
25 eat and would buy him a toy so that he'd know that he loved 
1 him. Even when he was not with me, he would take him to the 
2 park and spend time with him. That I did know, he always had 
3 Joseph first. 
4 Q How often would that happen that he would see Joseph? 
5 A He would make sure he saw him at least two or three 
6 times out of the week just to let Joseph know, and if he 
7 couldn't make it, it was at least one time out of the week and 
8 he would make sure he saw Joseph. He wanted to let him know 
9 that because mommy and daddy weren't together anymore, that he 
10 was always there for Joseph and he loved him very much. 
11 Q Would he talk to him on the telephone other times? 
12 A Yes, sir, he would. 
13 J Q When you saw Chato on May 20th, did he seem like his 
14 normal self that day? 
15 A No, sir, he didn't. He looked like he was in a daze. 
16 He did not look like he was there. That's — he didn't look 
17 like his normal self. He's usually pretty happy, a pretty 
18 peppy-type person, but he didn't seem like that at that time. 
19 I He was very solemn, quiet look, almost: like a sad, hurt look, 
20 it looked like to me. But, no, he didn't seem like himself at 
21 that time. 
22 Q And how far in the conversation was it that he said 
23 he'd killed Angie? 
24 A How far? You mean the time — 
25 Q Did it happen up front, beginning or — 
1 A No, sir, no, he didn't tell me right up front, I had 
2 to ask him what was going on, I kept asking. And that's when 
3 he came to the conversation that he said that he did that to 
4 her, and I just didn't believe it. I don't know how long we 
5 were out there in conversation, to be honest with you. I don't 
6 know how far into the conversation, but it wasn't at the 
7 beginning of the conversation that he said that. 
8 Q But at some point he went into some details about 
9 what had happened? 
10 A Yes, sir. 
11 Q And what did he say in that regard? 
12 A He said that he wanted to go see his son. He 
13 indicated again that he wanted to visit with Joseph and that 
14 she tried to stop him. And he says, You're not going to stop 
15 me from seeing my son, I want to go visit, I want to go see 
16 him. 
17 And she said, I think he said, You don't want to go 
18 see your son, you want to go see her. 
19 And he says, That's his mother, she's going to be 
20 there, you know, but it's to see my son. And she's always 
21 there ever since I've gone to go visit with him, she's there, 
22 you know, that's the deal now, or something like that. 
23 And she said — seemed like she got into a jealous 
24 rage, told him that he wasn't going to go see him, You're not 
25 going to go see him and I'm not going to let you go out, is 
1 what he was telling me. 
2 He said he was walking out and all I saw — all I 
3 know is he said that she had a gun and she approached him and 
4 said, If you walk out of that door, I'll shoot you with this 
5 gun. 
6 And he said, Please, Angie, I want to go see my son. 
7 I'm asking you again, I want to go see my son. 
8 And she didn't want him to go and that's when he said 
9 he took out the knife, turned around and looked at her and 
10 says, Okay, let's see who wins. And that's all he told me, to 
11 my memory. I don't remember anything else after that. 
12 Q Did he say if she pointed the gun at him? 
13 A Yes, sir, he said she pointed the gun at him. 
14 Q Did she make any threats? 
15 A Yes, sir. Well, from what he told me, she said that, 
16 I'll shoot a bullet through your head if you walk out that 
17 door, something in that sense. And, yes, sir, he said that she 
18 had a gun. That's all I knew. 
19 Q Did you ask what happened to the gun? 
20 A Yes, sir, I think I did ask him and he didn't tell me 
21 anything, he didn't mention anything to me. He didn't say 
22 anything so I let it go. And then I indicated to him if — I 
23 did tell him the conversation that if he turned himself in to 
24 the police that he could claim it was self-defense, you know, 
25 if she had a weapon. And, you know, show it to them or let 
1 them know where it's at so he could claim that it was a 
2 self-defense situation in this case. That's what I remember 
3 saying, 
4 Q Did he say anything in response to that? 
5 A No, sir. He started crying, he started saying that 
6 he loved Joseph very much, that he always loved me. He gave me 
7 this necklace for my birthday and he says, You still have it 
8 on. And I go, Yes, I do, and I've never taken it — removed it 
9 since you left me. It's close to my heart. 
10 He says, Always remember that I still love you and I 
11 love Joseph very much. And then that's when I told him I had 
12 to go back to work. 
13 Q How were you feeling at that time? 
14 A I couldn't even go back to work, I wasn't thinking. 
15 I must have been so nervous, because I remember that when I was 
16 in — I'm a cashier. I actually gave out — I don't know how I 
17 did, I wasn't thinking straight, I must have given one of the 
18 customers more than she was supposed to get back in change 
19 because by the end of my shift, I was short $80. I came up to 
20 my boss and I said, Look, this is what's going on, I don't know 
21 what happened to that money, I didn't steal it. Then I told 
22 him what had happened. 
23 I had to let my supervisor know because I wasn't in a 
24 good state at that time, I was very nervous. I actually wanted 









































.11 all calm down. 
I guess I wasn't thinking. I was very nervous and 
of what I'd heard. I refused to believe when he was 
f me. I kept saying, It's not true, it's not true. 
what I said, it can't be true, I kept denying it, it 
t be true. I kept saying he wouldn't do something like 
Okay. Did Ms. Zabriskie have a son? 
I heard that she had a son, but I never saw him. But 
I that she — through conversation, that she had a son. 
Do you know how old he was? 
No, sir, at that time I didn't know how old he was. 
Do you know where he lived? 
No, sir, I don't know where he lived either. 
MR. HEINEMAN: Okay. May I have a moment? 1 
No further questions. 
THE COURT: Is that it? 










Ma'am, did the defendant ever — did you ever see him 
gun? 
When he was living with her or — 


























A Yeah, there was a situation maybe a while back that 

















Was it a handgun or a long gun? 
I don't know the difference between a handgun and a 
A rifle or a handgun? 
Oh, it was a little gun. 
How long before this incident did you see that? 
Probably maybe about a year before. 
Did you ever see Ms. Zabriskie with a gun? 
No, sir. 
Do you know where Mr. Cruz-Meza was living on 
No, sir, I didn't know where he was living at that 
MR. D'ALESANDRO: That's all I have, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. HEINEMAN: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
MR. D'ALESANDRO: May she be excused, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: She may. You may leave. 
MS. WISSLER: State calls Dr. Todd Grey, Your Honor. 
THE CLERK: Do you solemnly swear the information you 
shall give in this case will be the truth, the whole truth and 
noth ing but the truth, so help you God? 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: STATE'S 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
Case No. 001909082 
Hon. Judith S. Atherton 
The State's Motion in Limine to Exclude Hearsay Statements came before this 
Court for oral argument on January 8, 2001. The defendant was present and was 
represented by Robert Heineman and Heidi Buchi of Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
Association, and the State was represented by N. M. D'Alesandro and Sirena M. Wissler, 
Deputy District Attorneys for Salt Lake County. The Court, having read the memoranda 
submitted by the parties, having reviewed the Preliminary Hearing transcript as 
incorporated herein, and having heard argument, and being fully apprised of the facts and 
legal argument, hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 20, 2000, at approximately 11:20 a.m., South Salt Lake Police 
Officer Jose Ortiz responded to 3818 South Camelot Village, Apartment 
v?«i 
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Number 10, in Salt Lake County, on a "check the welfare" call. (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript, hereafter, "PH," at page 9) 
2. Upon receiving no answer to three separate knocks at the door, Officer Ortiz 
entered and discovered the body of Angie Zabriskie. (PH, page 10) 
3. There were no other people inside Ms. Zabriskie's apartment when officers 
arrived. (PH, page 14) 
4. An examination and autopsy later revealed that Ms. Zabriskie had been 
stabbed IS times and died from multiple sharp force injuries. (PH, pages 103, 
109) 
5. No guns or other weapons were found during a search of Ms. Zabriskie's 
apartment. (PH, pages 16,30) 
6. No bullet holes were located in Ms. Zabriskie's apartment. (PH, page 16) 
7. A t-shirt was discovered in the hallway of Ms. Zabriskie's apartment. (PH, 
pages 32-33) 
8. A reddish-colored liquid was discovered on the bathroom sink, floor, bathtub 
area, and bathroom wall of Ms. Zabriskie's apartment. (PH, pages 33-34) 
9. Prior to the time of her death, Ms. Zabriskie had been involved in a 
relationship with the defendant, Jose Cruz-Meza. (PH, pages 92 - 93) 
10. Defendant was observed leaving Ms. Zabriskie's apartment complex between 
7:00 and 8:30 a.m. on the morning of May 20. Defendant was driving Ms. 
Zabriskie's car. (PH, pages 120 - 122) 
11. The tires of Ms. Zabriskie's car screeched as defendant drove it out of the 
parking lot. (PH, page 126) 
12. At approximately 9:00 a.m. on May 20, defendant appeared at the home of 
Araceli Vallejo in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (PH, pages 57-58) 
13. During the time defendant spent with Ms. Vallejo, the two had a conversation 
about money, and ultimately Ms. Vallejo gave defendant $50. (PH, pages 63-
64) Defendant then left (PH, page 64) 
14. Later on May 20, defendant appeared at the Home Depot at 9000 South and 
Redwood Road. (PH, pages 75 - 76) 
15. Bonnie Santa-Cruz, the mother of defendant's child, was working at the Home 
Depot on 9000 South and Redwood Road on May 20. (PH, pages 75 - 76) 
16. Defendant was still driving Ms. Zabriskie's car when he arrived at the Home 
Depot on May 20. (PH, pages 80-81) 
17. Defendant and Ms. Santa-Cruz went to Ms. Zabriskie's car in the Home Depot 
parking lot They sat inside and had a conversation that lasted in excess of 15 
minutes. (PH, pages 81 -84,91) 
18. Between one and five hours had elapsed between the time that Ms. Zabriskie 
was killed and the time defendant met with Bonnie Santa-Cruz in the Home 
Depot parking lot (Transcript of Motion Hearing, hereafter, "MH," page 38) 
19. During the conversation in Ms. Zabriskie's car in the Home Depot parking lot, 
defendant indicated to Ms. Santa-Cruz that he had been to see his son in 
Pleasant Grove prior to meeting her at the Home Depot (PH, pages 82-83) 
20. During the same conversation in Ms. Zabriskie's car, defendant admitted to 
Ms. Santa-Cruz that he had killed Ms. Zabriskie. When Ms. Santa-Cruz 
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expressed disbelief, defendant showed her a bloody knife and indicated that he 
had used that knife to kill Ms. Zabriskie. (PH, pages 84 - 85) 
21. Defendant told Ms. Santa-Cruz that he had killed Angie Zabriskie because she 
had a gun and told the defendant "if you walk out of this door, I'll shoot you 
with this gun, put a bullet through your head." (PH, page 89) 
22. Ms. Santa-Cruz looked at defendant to see whether she could find any cuts or 
injuries on him and saw none. (PH, page 84) 
23. Ms. Santa-Cruz did not see a gun in the car. (PH, page 88) 
24. Ms. Zabriskie's car was recovered approximately 10 days after she was killed 
at 12300 South and approximately 1960 East in Salt Lake County. (PH, page 
48) 
25. There was no gun found in Ms. Zabriskie's vehicle when it was searched 
incident to its impound (PH, page 49) 
26. During their conversation, defendant indicated to Ms. Santa-Cruz that perhaps 
he would go to Mexico. (PH, page 90) 
27. Ms. Santa-Cruz gave defendant some money that she had in her pocket. She 
believed it was $5 or $6. (PH, page 90) 
28. Defendant was arrested in Payson, Utah, on May 20,2000. (PH, page 42) 
29. Between the time of the homicide and the time of the defendant's statements, 
he had traveled between 35 and 40 miles to Pleasant Grove, Utah, visited with 
his son, and then traveled back. (MH, page 39) 
30. During the time between the homicide and the defendant's statements, 
defendant had ample time for reflection. (MH, page 39) 
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31. In the hours after the homicide, the evidence suggests that defendant: removed 
his shirt, put on a different one, washed up at the bathroom sink in Ms. 
Zabriskie's apartment, got into Ms. Zabriskie's car, drove to Pleasant Grove, 
visited with his son, drove from Pleasant Grove to Draper, Utah, visited with 
Bonnie Santa-Cruz, and conversed with her for several minutes before 
confessing to her that he had killed Angie Zabriskie. (MH, page 39, 
incorporating page 7 of the State's Memorandum in Reply to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition to State's Motion to Exclude Hearsay 
Statements) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Rule of Evidence 106 does not require the admission of defendant's 
entire statement to Ms. Santa-Cruz. Rule 106, by its own terms and 
pursuant to State v. Ula*% 933 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1999), applies only to 
written or recorded statements. Because defendant's statements to Ms. 
Santa-Cruz were neither written nor recorded, Rule 106 is inapplicable. 
2. Defendant's statements do not qualify as an excited utterance under Utah 
Rule of Evidence 803(2). Defendant's statement to Ms. Santa-Cruz was 
made hours after die killing, and after he had had a great deal of time for 
reflective thought In addition, the conduct in which defendant was 
engaged during the time between the killing and the confession indicates 
that the statement made to Ms. Santa-Cruz was not made spontaneously 
while the defendant was still under the stress of excitement caused by a 
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startling event. Therefore, defendant's statement to Ms. Santa-Cruz does 
not qualify as an excited utterance. 
3. Defendant's exculpatory statement to Ms. Santa-Cruz in which he explains 
his reasons for having killed Ms. Zabriskie is inadmissible hearsay. It is 
neither a statement of a party opponent, nor a statement against interest. 
Moreover, because it is exculpatory in nature, and because his claim that 
the victim had possessed a gun is uncorroborated by any evidence, the 
statement is unreliable. It bears none of the circumstantial guarantees or 
"pervasive assurances of trustworthiness" that are characteristic of hearsay 
statements admitted in other cases. Defendant's exculpatory statement to 
Ms. Santa-Cruz, therefore, is inadmissible. 
4. The statements that the defendant attributes to the victim, Angie Zabriskie, 
have no basis of reliability. Defendant's statement with regard to Ms. 
Zabriskie's alleged threats is completely self-serving, is uncorroborated by 
any evidence, and was not made spontaneously. Defendant's statement 
does not bear any of the indicia of reliability identified by the Supreme 
Courts of the United States or Utah that, if present, would override the fact 
that such statements are hearsay not within any exception, and therefore 
inadmissible. See, State v. Parker, 4 P. 3d 778 (Utah 2000). Defendant 
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does not enjoy a due process right to present such unreliable hearsay 
evidence before the jury. 
DATED this 2 ^ day of ftbrearfcoOi. 
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